

JPRS-WER-84-042

6 April 1984

West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

6 April 1984

WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Afheldt's Alternative Defense Strategy Elaborated
(Ruediger Moniac; DIE WELT, 5 Dec 83) 1

TERRORISM

TURKEY

- Mumcu on Kintex Related Libel Suit
(Ugur Mumcu; CUMHURIYET, 6 Mar 84) 4

POLITICAL

BELGIUM

- Profile of Flemish Socialists' Galle
(KNACK, 22 Feb 84) 7

- Poll Shows Trends in Party Popularity
(LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 5 Mar 84) 11

CYPRUS

- Denktas on Non-Aggression Pact, Greek Cypriot 'Ploys'
(CUMHURIYET, 12 Mar 84) 13

- Erel Wary About Papandreou's Washington Maneuvers
(Teoman Erel; MILLIYET, 12 Mar 84) 14

DENMARK/GREENLAND

| | |
|---|----|
| Dissension Over EC Withdrawal Pact Leads to Election (INFORMATION, 12 Mar 84; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 14, 17 Mar 84) | 17 |
| Internal Fight in Atassut Policy Toward Copenhagen Also Issue, by Dan Axel Election Set for 6 June, by Dan Axel | |
| Greenlander Describes Shock of Modernization for Society (Hans Christian Lynge; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 14 Mar 84) | 24 |
| Agreement With Civil Servants Union Reached After Year of Talks (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 16 Mar 84) | 29 |

FINLAND

| | |
|---|----|
| Socialist Party Should Be Concerned About Members' Apathy (Editorial; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 2 Mar 84) | 30 |
| Rural Party Joins 'Peace Defenders' After Years of Opposition (Kaija Lahteenmaa; UUSI SUOMI, 1 Mar 84) | 32 |
| Briefs Literature-Smuggling to USSR | 34 |

FRANCE

| | |
|---|----|
| Details of French Support for Pro-Vietnamese Cambodian Groups (AUTRES MONDES, 26 Jan 84) | 35 |
|---|----|

TURKEY

| | |
|---|----|
| Ozal Responds on Major Political, Legal Issues (Erbil Tusalp; CUMHURİYET, 12 Mar 84) | 41 |
| Ulman Assesses 'Anatomy' of Turkish-Greek Dispute (Haluk Ulman; DUNYA, 12 Mar 84) | 44 |

MILITARY

BELGIUM

| | |
|---|----|
| Vreven on Military Budget, Length of Service (Roger Rosart; LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 1 Mar 84) | 46 |
|---|----|

FINLAND

| | |
|---|----|
| Domestic Aviation Industry Aided by Hawk Counterpurchase Deal (Jyri Raivio; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 6 Mar 84) | 48 |
|---|----|

FRANCE

Briefs

| | |
|---------------------|----|
| Arms Sales for 1983 | 53 |
|---------------------|----|

NORWAY

| | |
|--|----|
| Defense Minister Asks Additional Funds for Sub Hunt (Liv Hegna; AFTENPOSTEN, 25 Feb 84) | 54 |
| Norwegian Underwater Warfare Experts on Minisubs Off Sweden (Rolf L. Larsen; AFTENPOSTEN, 8 Mar 84) | 55 |
| Defense Planners Criticized for Avoiding Realities (AFTENPOSTEN, 6 Mar 84) | 58 |

ECONOMIC

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

| | |
|--|----|
| Thorn on EC Agriculture, Budgets, Summits (Yves Benoit, et al.; LE SOIR, 12 Mar 84) | 59 |
|--|----|

ITALY

| | |
|---|----|
| Text of Government Incomes Policy Decree (RASSEGNA SINDACALE, 24 Feb 84) | 63 |
|---|----|

SPAIN

| | |
|---|----|
| Reduction in Financing for Private Sector (Amancio Fernandez; ABC, 11 Mar 84) | 66 |
| Debts, Excess Labor in Shipyards SAP State Funds (Vicente Clavero; ABC, 11 Mar 84) | 68 |

TURKEY

| | |
|--|----|
| Ulagay Expresses Sharp Doubts About Ozal Policy (Osman Ulagay; CUMHURIYET, 12 Mar 84) | 70 |
| Small Business Urges Financial Support for Survival (TERCUMAN, 12 Mar 84) | 73 |
| Turkish Foreign Trade With West Intensifies (DUNYA, 6 Mar 84) | 74 |
| Overview of Turkey's 1983 Trade Performance (DUNYA, 6 Mar 84) | 76 |

| | |
|---|----|
| Progress Report on Ozal Economic Policy (CUMHURIYET, 6 Mar 84) | 78 |
|---|----|

OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

FRANCE

| | |
|---|----|
| Research Centers Focus on Ocean Floor Nodules (Olivier Fleurot; LES ECHOS, 2 Feb 84) | 81 |
|---|----|

TURKEY

| | |
|--|----|
| Soviet Black Sea Economic Zone Disturbs Ankara (CUMHURIYET, 6 Mar 84) | 83 |
|--|----|

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

| | |
|--|----|
| 'Acid Rain' Fight Planned by EC Parliament (EUROPAEISCHE ZEITUNG, Feb 84) | 85 |
|--|----|

Briefs

| | |
|------------------------------------|----|
| Commission Addresses Air Pollution | 87 |
| Disagreement on Toxin Disposal | 87 |

AFHELDT'S ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE STRATEGY ELABORATED

Bonn DIE WELT in German 5 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by Ruediger Moniac]

[Excerpt] Horst Afheldt, doctor of political science, born in 1924, a staff member at the Max Planck Institute for Social Sciences in Starnberg, has been the most notable exponent of "defensive defense" for years, as noted in the jacket-cover blurb of the recently published "rororo-aktuell" volume of the same title.

Such "defensive defense," the blurb further states, will be organized in such a way that it will not offensively endanger other nations, yet at the same time an attack on a country's own territory can be deflected. The text describes the concept's central features as a changeover to conventional defensive weapons and the intelligent use of modern and cost-efficient weapons technology that will not provide the enemy with any major objectives that would make the use of nuclear weapons worthwhile.

This then is the keyword: no worthwhile objectives for the enemy, particularly none for using nuclear weapons. Horst Afheldt, formerly a close associate of physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, hopes to demonstrate a way to make NATO defenses independent of the use of nuclear weapons and to prevent offering the enemy any "militarily rewarding objectives" for using its nuclear weapons. Then, according to Afheldt, "we can hope, with NATO's invulnerably deployed nuclear weapons, to deter the enemy from using its nuclear weapons and to make extremely unlikely both the military and political use of nuclear weapons by both sides in Europe."

His mentor, Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, gave concrete shape to this requirement years ago, when the decision concerning the NATO double decision was imminent in the alliance by stating that intermediate-range weapons should not be deployed on land, but at sea, in submarines, where they cannot be hit.

Until conventional defenses in Europe have met Afheldt's required standard, these nuclear systems at sea shall also retain the mission of launching a first strike, but only "for exclusively political purposes."

With regard to conventional NATO defenses, Afheldt believes that outfitting with strictly defensive weapons would have certain favorable political effects, which would ultimately be able to stabilize the situation in Europe. Afheldt believes that this would not compel the enemy to keep pace, leading to an increased arms buildup, to the so-called arms race. In addition, according to Afheldt, this kind of defensive outfitting helps to eliminate any military advantage of a preventive or preemptive strike. And finally, Afheldt believes that it contributes to building a Western defense which "is not suicidal." Because to begin with, he states as his premise, "a suicidal defense deters the defender more than the attacker... a suicidal defense is not acceptable to the other side, even in an extended period of peace."

Complaints of Lost Consensus

Consensus is the concept which is increasingly determining the current public debate on security policy and the right way to assure peace. The Social Democrats use it, first of all, to say that the current NATO strategy of deterrence must be further developed, even superseded, as Helmut Schmidt stated in his Hamburg speech on the 10th anniversary of the Bundeswehr College. But "Greens," "Alternatives" and other movements are also complaining about the lost consensus.

Critics object that this method corresponds to an image of arsonists crying "fire." They believe that those forces will ultimately have helped to arouse distrust and even fear of NATO defenses, in order to be then able to say that they must be replaced by something else, whose effect will be less self-destructive and thus less "self-deterrent."

With his concept of area defense, which he borrowed from other strategists such as Brossolet and Spannocchi and developed further, Afheldt believes that he has found the "acceptable" way. His proposals will definitely have an effect politically, for besides the "Greens," powerful forces in the SPD are concentrating on developing a concept of "alternative defense." The Social Democrats' coming party congress in May, as yet undetermined city in the Ruhr Valley area, could be shaped by this issue.

Area defense, as conceived by Afheldt, leaves the advancing enemy undisturbed on its own territory. Only when its armored units cross the border will "special technical detachments," scattered throughout the country as far as the Rhine and equipped with guided missiles with faulty active homing systems, wear down the attacking columns by attrition, using "hit-and-run" guerrilla tactics, finally bringing them to a standstill. Afheldt believes that these special detachments should consist of motorized (light) infantry, artilleryment with missiles effective over distances of up to 80 kilometers, and intelligence soldiers who would target the enemy dispositions within their area of observation, for their own artillery.

In his book, Afheldt provides estimates according to which the aggressor will have lost more than 50 percent of its forces along the 230 kilometers of road between the "Thuringian Balcony" and the Rhine and would arrive "at best after 14 days." Afheldt believes that this would necessarily deter the Soviet Union, "which alone is considered the aggressor," nor its East European neighbors. Its attack would, with "a high degree of certainty," fail and it would "lose... its army in the process. For such a loss is tantamount to the danger of its then also losing its East European glacis."

For experts at the Bonn Defense Ministry, the plan of "defensive defense" is fraught with many questions. Military arguments predominate, but there are political arguments as well. Probably the most important have been submitted by former General Schulze, form NATO commander in chief for Central Europe, and General Domroese, former chief of planning at NATO headquarters of the commander in chief for all Europe. Their argument: concepts such as this would permit war on our continent to again be considered feasible in the enemy's calculations.

Critics Warn: War Would Be Likely

Both men say what Bundeswehr Chief of Staff Altenburg also states in the just published book, "Die Atomschwelle heben" [Raising the Nuclear Threshold], about the special role of nuclear weapons in NATO's concept of military strategy. It is based on the assumption, Altenburg writes, "that in peacetime, as in wartime, the strongest deterrent effect is achieved by nuclear weapons, since the risk to an aggressor can ultimately be made clear only by threatening to use them or actually using them." And the general continues: "The nature of nuclear weapons as a potential means of mass destruction and the dangers of mutual escalation limit the military usefulness of such weapons. Nuclear weapons are thus to be judged primarily on the basis of their political usefulness and only secondarily on the basis of their military effect on combat."

Defense Manfred Woerner also maintains that deterrence is assured "for the foreseeable future" only by nuclear weapons and that there is no equivalent conventional substitute. Woerner's thinking in this regard, in weighing the possibilities of developing conventional weapons, is not nearly so extreme as Afheldt's. Woerner, like U.S. General Rogers and others, does not wish to abandon his own position, one directly opposed to that advocated by proponents of "defensive defense," namely that the Soviet Union, in the event of its launching a military aggression, would be free of any risk of Moscow's destruction.

12580
CSO: 3620/113

MUMCU ON KINTEX RELATED LIBEL SUIT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 Mar 84 pp 1,11

[Article by Ugur Mumcu]

[Text] My readers will recall: Due to my publications concerning relations among Trakya Transport, Balkan Transport companies and the Bulgarian company, Kintex, the officials of this company had filed a libel suit against our newspaper. These libel suits have been overruled and the ruling has been finalised.

I am passing on, without comment, certain parts of the ruling of the IV. Legal Department of the Superior Court, dated 19 April 1983 number 1983/3316-3996:

'1-It has been alleged that the plaintiff company has founded the Trakya Transportation Company jointly with MAT company, a state enterprise operating in Bulgaria; that the company was founded despite raised objections through the Turkish partners' influence over the government,
2-Questions have been raised and explanations offered with regard to whether transactions conducted or to be conducted in the future by the plaintiff company, directly or through the newly founded company, had anything to do with arms smuggling across Bulgaria.

In these publications it has not been directly alleged that the plaintiff company had been involved in smuggling. However, it should be admitted that in the portrayal of the sequence of events concerning the plaintiff's relations with the Bulgarian company and the founding of the subsidiary company, the implication is that "smuggling may be involved." For this reason, such publications are an affront to the personal values of the plaintiff. For us to talk about violation of the law, it is necessary that such effrontery should reach a level where individual rights no longer suffice for their protection. It should, unreservedly, be admitted that such publications do serve public benefit provided they are true. Considering the extent of the smuggling activities in our country, and their social, economic and political repercussions, smuggling is an important and topical subject from the journalistic viewpoint. Therefore, we should be dwelling on whether what is being told in these publications, and particularly whether the events which the story is

premisses upon, happen to be true:

a-According to the charter of the Trakya Transport Company (founded by the plaintiff company jointly with a Bulgarian firm) published in the Commercial Register Gazette on 28 February 1976: It has been noted that among the founding members, alongside the plaintiff and the Bulgarian state enterprise MAT, were real persons M. Ustunkaya, A. Tunga, H. Kursat, D. Tunga, G. Gunsar and that the plaintiff possessed 745 shares, the Bulgarian MAT company 750 shares, and the five real-person-founding-partners one share each (making a total of five).

b-The founding of Trakya Transport Company which is a joint Turkish-Bulgarian enterprise has caused commotion at high bureaucratic echelons and passed through the following procedures:

a-Permission was granted on 6 June 1976, and by the 'OK of the high-ranking officials of the Finance Ministry', for the company to be formed. Indeed, while the permission was granted the ministry consulted with other ministers. However, the Ministry of Transport, in a memo dating 28 April 1976 notified that there is no objection to the formation of the company "provided that the approval of security organisations is forthcoming."

b-On the other hand, in a National Intelligence Agency memo sent to the prime ministry, on 18 March 1976 (after having evaluated the data on preparations for the company's formation) it was stated that the managing director's Bulgarian nationality, his permanent residence in Turkey and the maintenance of Bulgarian technicians in Anatolia would serve the interests of the Bulgarian intelligence agency. However, this memo was able to reach the Finance Ministry (which was to issue the permission for the formation of the company) five months later (on 20 August 1976), after the permission had already been granted.

c-In reply to an information request by the Finance Ministry (dated 25 March 1976), the Foreign Ministry pointed out (dated 9 August 1976) that the formation of the company would constitute a hurdle for Turkish TIR transportation and that, for the present, there was no need for the establishment of such a partnership.

d-In the meeting of the Turkish-Bulgarian joint company on 25 April 1977, Petkov, a Bulgarian national, was appointed the managing director of the company.

e-Upon request for information the Ministry of the Interior (on 20 September 1977) and the National Intelligence Agency (on 2 June 1977) stated that Petrov Dochev, the Bulgarian who had been appointed as managing director of the company, was an intelligence agent and that, broadly speaking, from the viewpoint of state security, it would be objectionable for the company to carry on its activities in Turkey.

3-Due to information involving security and the revival of the issue by the Ministry of Commerce, the Finance Ministry decided (on 3 September 1977) to dissolve the company through a judicial procedure. The case thus opened was

rejected by the Istanbul Commerce Court's ruling dated 3 September 1979 numbered 970/1311-419 "due to the unavailability of evidence despite precise deadlines, the excuse being that there may be certain drawbacks in presenting the evidence."

It is apparent that a company was formed which had been viewed as objectionable with regard to state security and drawing a good deal of suspicion in the process. The official prosecution of the court case which demanded that the company be dissolved is the prime evidence for this. The hasty processes involved in the formation of the company are there for all to see. The discussion over the influence of the real persons who have been founding partners of the company may seem not quite relevant to the case at hand. However, the involvement of these individuals (who have performed public duties at various levels of government particularly in the field of politics) with the company by becoming founding partners with a 1/1500 share, and their leaving the company a short while after its formation might, at the very least, produce some question marks and suspicions in people's minds. Therefore, the defendants' publications contain important aspects the reality of which cannot be ignored.'

Yes, we are announcing this Superior Court decision through the public media to all those officials holding the official files, the influence peddlers, those who are interested in us, those who would like to crush us, those who are trying to silence us through various means because we have mentioned their names.

For your information...

12466

CSO: 3554/178

PROFILE OF FLEMISH SOCIALISTS' GALLE

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 22 Feb 84 pp 13-16

[Report by F.V.: "Carla Galle Does it Herself"]

[Text] A former swimming champion recently rose to the post of first female national secretary of the SP [Socialist Party]. The Van Miert line continues. What is Carla Galle's motivation?

There wasn't a single Monday paper which did not honor her: Carla Galle (35) was in all of them, including her photograph, portrayed in detail as the new national secretary of the SP. Together with her colleague Mia De Vidts of the ABVV [Belgian General Federation of Labor] she proves that women are rising in the circles which in the not too distant past were dominated by Jos Van Eynde and Louis Major. The fact that she is a former swimming star, stared at by everyone on the tram 10 years ago, today increases the pithiness of her life story.

She is almost obviously the product of the socialist pillar. Born and raised in the region of Aalst, in the shadow of the locally very much admired foreman Bert van Hoorick and under the protection of the very virtuous eastern Flanders Senator Willy Vernimmen, she attends the (Greek-Latin) secondary school in Denderleeuw and learns to swim surprisingly late. As a girl of thirteen she happens to see a swimming club in the process of training and asks the gentleman there (the "rescuer") if she can participate. Two years later she is fully involved in the top sport, and she will continue being so until age 22.

She has a brother who today is a city engineer in Aalst and a mother who has a long career behind her as journalist at the BRT [Belgian Radio and Television--Dutch Service]. The family is quietly BSP [Belgian Socialist Party] with some local contacts, but not militant. Carla reads the books of Hugo Claus and Gerald Walschap a little earlier than Catholic girls, but it is not a case of a feverish political vocation.

She does, however, know the material modesty of a family that has to work for a daily living and she has "always had feeling" for weaker figures such as children, the aged, and abused animals. She eats meat with difficulty because an animal had to die for that.

Everyone of course is asking her now about the connection between sports and politics. In 5 years' time she gathered no less than 25 swimming championship titles. For that she had to sacrifice all her young girl's years to hard, daily

training. Every day up at 5:30 a.m., never a cigarette or a glass of wine. A hairdo which was green from chlorinated water and, until even today, a disgust of cold water. In her time, a covered and heated 50-meter swimming pool did not exist in Flanders, so every time she had to go to Wetteren to swim in an open-air pool of 15 to 16 degrees Celsius in order to practice. A very lonely sport, in which the individual only sees the chronometer. Few games; not a team sport. At the high point of fame in sport one also has to suffer considerably and without comment (the "renouncing") for the sake of victory and achievement.

Fortunately there are the Olympic Games of Mexico '68 and a number of tournaments or world competitions to allow travel, to get to know the camaraderie among athletes and to get acquainted with the feeling of defeat. She stops it in 1970, her best swimming period. "It was a conscious decision; I wanted to leave at the top of my form."

At that moment she was already attending the University of Ghent to study politics and social and diplomatic sciences. She had already missed the events of May 1968 because of the preparation for the Olympic games in October. Moreover, she had to attend as many classes as possible. Professors were not that terribly impressed with a girl who was spending too much time on swimming. From that type of a life Galle "learned the meaning of work and believing in something on her own."

The fact that that determined her character is beyond doubt and does not have to be stated to embellish the story. Carla Galle is beloved, admired or feared for her unquenchable urge for action and zest for work. She is probably a difficult person to work with, for she doesn't forgive laxity or doubt. Politically that means setting a target date, working toward something and, if it fails, not seeking excuses. People with too little adrenaline cannot keep up with that tempo and will probably be left behind without mercy.

In 1972 she finishes her studies and writes two dissertations: the first one about the humanitarian treaties of Geneva and, a year later, another one about the Lomé treaties between the EEC and its affiliated member states in Africa. With that dissertation she gets her degree in European Law. She even considers going into diplomacy, for that was easy at the time because of the Fayat policy, but she ends up reading the want ads in the paper. She almost enters a large chemical company, and she starts the BRT tests, but just in time Willy Vernimmen gets her into the secretariat of the socialist senate group. That happens in 1973.

That is because meanwhile she has started to play a role in the Aalster BSP life: chair person of the youth group and member of the regional executive. Attending meetings, sometimes arranging a small demonstration; it is again that extremely concrete doer-attitude and not much theory. "There is not a single good example in the world of a real socialist society. I don't think that socialism should be explained to the people through theories, but that it should be shown through real everyday politics. I cannot fight my social indignation and my ties with the working class and those without opportunity. I know there are also Christians who feel that way, but in my case it coincides with the socialist ethic: being comrades, being solidary. I find it somewhat of a pity that the telephone operator in the parliament building on the Keizerslaan no longer says 'comrade' to everyone who phones."

Starting from the credo that /doing is really more difficult than thinking/, and absolutely refusing to worry too much about the future (for tomorrow we'll see), the young woman of only 35 thus appears in the cénacle of the Senate. There she writes speeches for politicians and sorts out the chamber debates, searching for subjects which will come up for discussion. She is free and single out of a conscious choice. "I opted for competitive sports and for politics. That means an enormous amount of work, and one can't do everything in one's life." Thanks to Bert Van Hoorick in Aalst she doesn't suffer too much from the rigidity and the certain aged quality in the BSP of the first half of the seventies. Aalst always has been a younger, more Flemish, more leftist, more activist and more concrete federation than the others. For that matter, Van Hoorick had been preaching for quite a while that more women ought to be involved in the matter.

And then comes Karel Van Miert. Willy Claes snatches him away from Simonet at the European Community. Van Miert becomes adjunct national secretary. In June 1977 when his Limburg patron has to enter a government again, he is handed the chairmanship after a short and almost abrupt procedure. Van Miert in turn snatches Freddy Wollockx from the union together with other young revisionists. Among them is Carla Galle; she gets a phone call, has to come for a talk, asks for a month to think it over and finally crosses over to the party without an official function, title or status. She joins the club, at least on a trial basis. Later on her professional situation will get some protection. In 1982 she gets an appointment at the general commissariat for international cooperation and thus becomes a civil servant. However, she won't fulfill the duties of that post for even a day. She requests, and is immediately given, leave without pay--a situation which, however, must last no longer than two two-year-periods.

Restless

She loses no time objecting to the reproach that everything was very well arranged by a clique of young party bosses. "I did not cost the society a penny. I am not after high wages, and I have to answer for myself." No doubt they knew that on the Keizerslaan. Carla Galle throws herself quite tempestuously into do-it-yourself politics and gets involved in practically everything. The study center (Sevi) is already fully expanded now, with dozens of new people. But also the membership paper, in complete hibernation, was started up again in the course of 1980. The training institute and the socialist broadcasting system are inspired with new life. Moreover, Galle has parliamentary experience and Van Miert doesn't. Her growth is restless. She always gets to the office early and goes home late. A protégée of the chairman? She fiercely defends herself: "Van Miert gives /room/ to all his collaborators. You have to be worthy of that trust and make something of it. But that applies not only to me. There are many Van Miert boys and girls."

The latter indeed are not sitting still, but many Flemish socialists are not entirely sure whether they are on the right track. There is the heavy emphasis on the Flemish character of the SP ("a leftist People's Union"); the very autonomous federations don't like to share their decisions with the Keizerslaan; and the Breakthrough Operation is not getting off the ground very clearly. Carla Galle thinks that those are indeed problems but that things are looking up for the SP in Flanders. "We have the best parliamentary group in the Chamber, with people such as Tobback, Bossuyt, Claes, Van den Bossche, Willockx and De Batselier. The public

which comes to our congresses is younger and better educated than in the past. Women participate, also in the Breakthrough idea which booked its first results in the municipal elections of 1982. Further one should not see the breakthrough as an electoral construction. It is more a matter of participation of progressive people from all directions in action groups and grass roots movements. The fact that for the time being very few leftist liberals are included is not our fault. There are hardly any at this time."

As national secretary she succeeds Gerrit Kreveld. He retired after 9 years in that post. His predecessors were Jan Luyten (who was dismissed after a scandal with money which had disappeared from the fund for development cooperation) and none less than the late Antoon Spinooy who, as minister of Economic Affairs, was one of the pioneers of the regional industrial policy in Flanders. The question of whether Carla Galle will also cross over to parliamentary politics seems to be out of place for the time being. She happens to be the organizing and administrative type who undoubtedly will get the entire party apparatus put to work. No doubt she will make herself unloved through that, and that does not promote the acquiring of good spots on election lists. Moreover she is rather insistent on the separation between party and union. "The latter exists primarily for working people and the protection of those people's interests. The party exists more for the finding of a political and economic answer to unemployment. I think it is doing a lot in that respect. Our alternative SP model against the crisis fits all the details. The government blames us for always having been bad and wasteful managers of state affairs, but that is a myth. The people really do notice today how bad a job the conservative blue-blooded coalition is doing. Our time in the opposition no doubt will gradually clarify things even more. I think it is very good to have such a time of reinspiration and sharpened fighting spirit. And even though I know that one can avert considerable damage by being inside the government, I feel fine outside it."

8700

CSO: 3614/54

POLL SHOWS TRENDS IN PARTY POPULARITY

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 5 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by A.M.: "Di Marso: CVP [Socialist Christian Party (Flemish)] and PSC [Socialist Christian Party (Walloon)] Advance, PRL [Liberal Reform Party (Walloon)] and PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)] Fall Back"]

[Text] A favorable wind has just put us in possession of the results of a poll conducted at the end of January by the Di Marso Company (the percentages are given on a national basis).

The accompanying table enables us to make comparisons with the result of the legislative elections of November 1981 and also to observe some appreciable differences between the results of the poll taken at the beginning of January and that conducted at the end of the same month.

It will be noted that the Social-Christian parties made a slight advance, whereas the PRL [Liberal Reform Party (Walloon)] and the PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)] fell back.

8089

CSO: 3619/43

| | <u>Nov</u> <u>1981</u> | <u>Oct</u> <u>1982</u> | <u>Mar</u> <u>1983</u> | <u>Jun</u> <u>1983</u> | <u>Sep</u> <u>1983</u> | <u>Nov</u> <u>1983</u> | <u>Beginning of</u> <u>Jan 1984</u> | <u>End of</u> <u>Jan 1984</u> |
|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| Party of Liberty and Progress [Flemish] | 12.9 | 11.9 | 12.7 | 11.8 | 12.0 | 12.9 | 12.3 | 12.5 |
| Liberal Reform Party [Walloon] | 8.6 | 8.0 | 9.2 | 9.3 | 9.6 | 8.6 | 9.7 | 8.4 |
| Socialist Party [Flemish] | 12.3 | 12.9 | 11.8 | 12.3 | 12.7 | 12.3 | 11.7 | 11.8 |
| Socialist Party [Walloon] | 12.8 | 12.8 | 12.8 | 12.0 | 12.8 | 12.8 | 13.2 | 12.4 |
| Socialist Christian Party [Flemish] | 19.3 | 18.2 | 16.4 | 18.5 | 18.2 | 19.3 | 18.8 | 19.6 |
| Socialist Christian Party [Walloon] | 7.1 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 6.0 | 7.1 | 6.4 | 7.0 |
| People's Union [Flemish] | 9.7 | 9.9 | 10.6 | 10.3 | 10.0 | 9.7 | 10.1 | 9.6 |
| Francophone Democratic Front | 4.3 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 4.1 |
| Ecology Party [Walloon] + Ecology Party [Flemish] | 4.8 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 4.8 | 5.5 | 5.1 |
| Others | 8.3 | - | 8.8 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 9.5 |
| Blanks | 6.3 | 6.2 | 9.1 | 6.1 | 8.3 | 6.3 | 7.0 | 7.9 |

DENKTAS ON NON-AGGRESSION PACT, GREEK CYPRIOT 'PLOYS'

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 12 Mar 84 pp 1,6

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] News Center - KKTC [Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus] President /Rauf Denktas/ made a proposal to /"sign a non-aggression pact with the Greeks."/ Denktas said that:/"he was ready to make such a pact, that he emphasized this again,"/ and he pointed out that:/"sooner or later the Cyprus issue would have to be solved peacefully; this is why resorting to arms to make the Turkish population accept things that are not acceptable to it is an unintelligent waste of human lives."/

After this proposal, which he made in Nicosia, Denktas left for New York to meet with UN Secretary General /Perez de Cuellar/. Rauf Denktas will meet with UN Secretary General /Perez de Cuellar/ on Friday 16 March. KKTC President Rauf Denktas held a press conference in the Istanbul Yesilkoy airport, on his way to New York. Denktas criticized this meeting for being /"late"/ and said /"inadmissible pressures from some circles"/ had delayed the trip to this day. Denktas added, with regard to the trip, that they would make a /"general evaluation"/. Denktas said they would suggest a new summit meeting within the framework of the peace proposals made to the Greek side on 2 January. He also emphasized that he would tell de Cuellar about the Greeks' preparations to take up arms. Denktas noted that the Greeks, using the pretext of the Turkish army which had brought peace to Cyprus, were saying /"we too will come,"/ and he added: /"The Greeks continue their policy of losing a battle in order to gain an island, of getting slapped in the face in order to obtain gifts. The same thing happened with Crete. They wish to play the same game as with Crete."/ Denktas noted that the leaders of the 2 opposition parties of the Greek Cypriot side, the AKEL (Greek Communist Party) and the Democratic Union Party (Papaioannou and Kleridis) bitterly criticized Papandrou's policies and he said:/"Turkish diplomacy has done away with that Byzantine game."/ He also said that:/"Some nations will not see facts, and we are warning those nations against the folly of Greek ambitions,"/ and he noted that the Greeks relied on their lobby in the U.S.A.

To the CUMHURIYET correspondent's question;/"Will you discuss again the Maras issue with Perez de Cuellar?"/ Denktas gave the following reply:/"The Maras issue is quite clear. Our views are well known. There is no need to put the Maras issue on the agenda of this meeting."/

EREL WARY ABOUT PAPANDREOU'S WASHINGTON MANEUVERS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 12 Mar 84 p 6

[Article by Teoman Erel in The Column "Telex": "Either Variosa or Famagusta?"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Intoxication from a victory is something out of this world...

The scenario we might call/"Tensions between Turkey and Greece in Reagan's election year"/ was written by Papandreou. He also plays the lead. The Aegean crisis through which we have been going in the last few days is only a small, one-act scene of that scenario.

The Turkish spectator who will be using his vote in 2 weeks' time is very pleased with the conclusion of this act. We are behaving as if we had won a victory.

Looking at the tension Papandreou himself created and at his eliminating it by a sudden reversal, we are saying:/"He put a shot into his own goal."/ If we go on being so relaxed, we might suddenly find out that several shots were put into our own goal. Such as Variosa being lost without anything in exchange... Or even Famagusta slipping out of our hands...

Yes, this is what we think: the next act will be related to Cyprus and will begin with the trip to the United States of America of Rauf Denktas who was literally forced to make it.

What would you say to snapping out of our relaxed attitude to begin the next act?

Let us look at the developments which followed Papandreou's sudden compliance...

Surprise! It is not only the Greek Premier who has become amenable but also the Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou... Kyprianou who was in Athens during this latest Aegean crisis is renouncing a very important initial stipulation which created difficulties about sitting at the table, according to news originating from Athens. The Greeks, who repeated that they would not contemplate a dialogue until Turkish soldiers were withdrawn from the island, now eliminate this demand. Good Lord... In what mountain can a wolf have died?[Said when something pleasant happens.] Did the Greeks change their traditional stance or do they appear to be compliant because they realized they will gain a serious advantage?

While the Greek paper ELEVTEROTYPIA which is published in Cyprus predicts: /"Denktas finally goes to New York to meet with de Cuellar. Very rapid developments are expected in the Cyprus issue,"/ it also speaks of /" an understanding to be reached on the subject of Famagusta."/ Can you see the expectation? While our public opinion believed that only the touristic area of Variosa, south of Famagusta, was the object of negotiations, they are asking for Famagusta which is the most important port of Northern Cyprus.

In fact Denktas had referred to this matter at the beginning of March. But while busy in Turkey with victory celebrations, we are unwilling to discuss the bitter aspect of the question. We would like to remind those who strut in the election forum as if they had put Papandreou's shoulders to the mat, of a Denktas speech which was broadcast 10 days ago, on 3 March, before he was sent to New York after the Aegean crisis:

/"We must think very carefully. The strongest NATO nation, America, makes the military aid it will give Turkey subject to whether we will relinquish the whole of Variosa or not. It asks for Variosa unconditionally and only speaks of a possibility of resuming the talks. We are supposed to show our good will by acceding to this [demand]. There can be no such [demonstration of] good will. We cannot give the Greek territories we protected with our blood, because America asked."/

And so now we wonder. Can Denktas retain now his determination? In the last part of the past 10 days, which were spent with the artificial tension of the Aegean, did America break the Turkish side's resistance? Or did the U.S.A. whisper into Papandreou's ear, at the last minute before he backed out, something like:/"Stop the escalation in the Aegean, we will wrest from the Turks a concrete compensation."/?

Has Denktas gone to America willingly or is he dragging his feet?

In the course of the developments we are relating, something Premier Ozal said gave us food for thought. The honorable Ozal complained that our entire foreign policy had come under pressure and said that this should not be so. He is right in what he says. But it is Uncle Sam who created this situation. As long as Turkey does not generate new counterbalances to the U.S. influence, or as long as it does not present Cyprus to the Greeks, it cannot prevent its policy from being blocked. In the long run, America has even tied the aid it will give Turkey to the compensations we will give the Greeks in Cyprus. And up to a point this was brought about by Papandreou's maneuvers, which we find comical. In the darkest hour of the Aegean crisis, in the note he sent to the U.S.A. Papandreou claimed that the aid given to Turkey encouraged Turkish daring. That is to say the Greek said to his Uncle Sam:/"Make the Turk compliant with the threat of cutting off aid, or else I will paralyze NATO's Southern wing. Furthermore, I will sway the Greek vote against Reagan in the U.S. presidential elections."/

Yes, the nations' domestic problems and their election calculations are also mixed up in those issues. Reagan, who wishes to put the Greek vote in his pocket, is putting pressure on the Turkish side. While the honorable Ozal, who is

squeezed between faltering American aid and a strong reaction from the people in the local elections which will be taking place in 2 weeks' time, affects the stance of the /"athlete who has put Papandreou's shoulders to the mat,"/ but he never mentions Famagusta or Variosa.

As for the crafty Greek premier, who will be faced with elections next year, he does not care much at this stage about the loss of prestige caused by his maneuvers in the meantime. He is planning to stage his big show for public opinion, with the results he will obtain by pushing Reagan into a corner until the presidential elections in the U.S.A., in next year's /"last act."/

12278

CSO: 3554/186

DISSENSION OVER EC WITHDRAWAL PACT LEADS TO ELECTION

Internal Fight in Atassut

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 12 Mar 84 p 10

[Text] Around this date 2 years ago, the 10-year-old Greenland independence movement reached its culmination when a majority of Greenlanders followed the recommendation of their first home-rule government, the Siumut [socialist, radical home-rule party] government, and voted "EC bai"--No to EC.

On Saturday a large majority of the Greenland parliament voted for the withdrawal agreement, so it can now be taken for granted that Greenland will leave the European Community on 1 January 1985.

From the first uncertain beginnings of the young socialist-oriented Greenland independence movement, which led to the home rule system and the creation of the Siumut Party, which has ruled Greenland so far under this arrangement, the fight against EC membership was of vital symbolic importance.

While clear-sighted young Greenlanders quickly abandoned romantic dreams of an immediate separation from Denmark, the colonial power, EC very conveniently filled the gap as representing intervention by a foreign power.

With the central role the EC issue has had in developing an independent political life in Greenland, it is very natural that the next to the last act in the years the liberation process has taken will also set its mark on the short history of local government, as happened Saturday evening when just after approving the withdrawal, the Greenland parliament somewhat surprisingly had a vote of no confidence in the Siumut government.

In the long and heated debate on this political issue that has dominated Greenland for many years now, it was inevitable that demagoguery and false promises sometimes gained the upper hand. Even though leading Siumut politicians have gone to a lot of trouble to stress that their desire for liberation from EC was something they were prepared to pay for, they have not always managed to maintain a realistic evaluation of the economic consequences of EC membership.

Now Greenland, with the totally loyal support of a Danish government that is friendly to EC, has been allowed to negotiate a withdrawal agreement that contradicts the direst threats of EC advocates in Greenland.

On the other hand, the agreement for the next 5 years is much more like a continuation of the terms of EC membership than the Siumut people and their allies in opposing EC had promised the general public.

Allowing the German ocean fleet and other EC fishermen to catch 107,000 tons of cod a year does not represent a substantial curtailment of EC's current fishing rights.

However, Greenland will receive 216 million kroner in "financial reimbursements," almost as much as the various support arrangements have provided in the past. And through a so-called OLT [Overseas Lands and Territories] agreement, Greenland will retain its free access to the European market.

One would have to have a very romantic concept of the possibilities of the small and deeply economically-dependent Greenland society to view this agreement as particularly unfavorable. And after 5 years in power, the Siumut politicians, who were pretty realistic to begin with, do not have much romanticism left in their political analyses.

It is quite different with the small left-wing party, Inuit Ataqatigiit [Alliance for Eskimo Fellowship]. In the last few years the party has moved closer to Siumut and has sought to exert influence, but its chances for existence consist of pushing the demands for independence and "development on our own terms" to the point where the realism of the exercise of power prevent the Siumut people from following.

But it has been strange to see the big moderate opposition party, Atassut [moderate, pro-Denmark party] flirting with the idea of blocking the withdrawal agreement.

Many in Greenland have been disappointed by the agreement and both Greenland weekly papers, GRONLANDSPOSTEN and SERMITSIAK, have recommended rejection.

Atassut, whose leaders with considerably more honesty could have pointed out how close the agreement is to continued membership, which Atassut has advocated, was quite opportunistic in playing with the idea of voting against the agreement, allegedly because it would give EC too many fish.

In last year's parliamentary election, Siumut lost its absolute majority, but was able to continue as the government party when it got support from the two IA [Inuit Ataqatigiit] members.

Faced with an unusual alliance between the opposition on both right and left over the EC issue, Siumut decided to issue a challenge. Government leader Jonathan Motzfeldt offered to resign and Siumut drew up an amendment

to the Greenland election law, making it possible to hold a parliamentary election ahead of time.

In the first round, the line of open confrontation unveiled Atassut's theatrical bravado. In spite of strong statements to the contrary, all the Atassut members of parliament voted for the agreement on Saturday. But apparently Atassut's humiliation was so great that it had to be avenged. After the agreement was approved, IA and Atassut joined forces in a vote of no confidence in the Siumut regime and a demand for a change in the government law so the government can be forced to resign and be replaced at any time in the election period. On the other hand, Siumut seems determined to implement its proposed change in the election law so there will be an opportunity to hold elections ahead of time.

Thus everything is primed for a regular parliamentary government crisis with a new election as a possible outcome. IA is hungry to enter an election campaign and score some votes on the basis of dashed anti-EC dreams. But Atassut is probably not prepared to go that far. The party's recent behavior can hardly be explained as anything but a sign of weakness. The party is marked by a succession conflict since its current chairman, Lars Chemnitz, who just made an unsuccessful bid for election to the Danish Folketing, announced that he will resign.

The internal conflict will threaten the party's unity, which has been guaranteed so far because of Chemnitz's vast experience and popularity, despite the fact that the party ranges in attitude all the way from what corresponds to the Danish Social Democrats to the right of the Progressives.

Atassut is hardly ready to become involved in an election and that can be decisive for the course of the Greenland government crisis in the next few days.

But however the crisis turns out, it looks as if the EC issue has been able to the end to produce new phases in a process of political maturation in Greenland.

Policy Toward Copenhagen Also Issue

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Mar 84 p 1

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] People and parties in the Greenland campaign that is gaining speed prior to the parliamentary election, which is expected to take place on 14 June--at the same time as the election to the EC Parliament.

The biggest political conflict issue in Greenland for the last 13 years--its relationship to EC--has all but been eliminated. And Greenland politicians must now get used to the fact that political crises will concern domestic matters--and relations with South Denmark.

With the Siumut-Atassut alliance in approving Greenland's agreement with EC--in connection with withdrawing from EC on 1 January 1985--and the calling of a new election ahead of time--Greenlanders are on the threshold of "Danish conditions": the constant struggle to find a majority that can keep the government alive.

When the change in the Greenland election law is approved, a parliamentary election is expected to be set for 14 June--the same day that Greenlanders will vote in an uncontested election to return their spokesman in EC, Finn Lynge, to the EC Parliament in Strasbourg. Where he will remain for the rest of the year.

People and Parties

Two parties of equal size--Atassut and Siumut--will enter the campaign on political programs for guiding Greenland through the social, economic and cultural crisis that everyone knows will come when the money from the South runs out. Most clear--but also quite isolated--is the third party in the game, Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA), with a straight socialist model of society in which the lifeline to Denmark is cut.

When the dedicated EC supporter Lars Chemnitz of Atassut--in Danish eyes, a nonsocialist-liberal party--recently allowed his party to vote for the EC agreement which the political opponents, the Siumut government party, had negotiated, he pledged to administer the arrangement, if his party has a majority after the election.

Thus Atassut has cemented Greenland's status as non-EC country and when the agreement with the European Community expires--and the payment of a gold 200 million kroner a year for fishing rights concessions comes to an end--the party's Danish-friendly course will meet a serious test.

For there are critical voices in Atassut too about Denmark's "administration" of Greenland and in particular Greenland Affairs Minister Tom Høyem, who is accused of having "the tendencies of a colonial gentleman." In particular, Atassut's representative in the Danish parliament, Otto Steenholdt, has used strong language.

Siumut Pastor

The tone has become somewhat more subdued after the last Folketing election in which Steenholdt changed his technical partnership cooperation from the Social Democrats to the Conservatives. At the same time he became chairman of Folketing's Greenland Committee.

The strong man in Greenland's political life for the last 10 years has been present government leader Jonathan Motzfeldt, who since 1972 has worked deliberately to get Greenland out of EC. A goal he achieved on Saturday when 24 of the Greenland Landsting's 26 members (only Inuit opposed the vote) approved the withdrawal agreement with EC.

Greenland took the first important step in Motzfeldt's direction a good 2 years ago when a popular referendum decided by a scant majority that the Greenland Landsting and the Danish government should work together to negotiate a formal withdrawal from EC.

Motzfeldt leads Siumut, which in Danish terminology is reckoned as a left-wing Social Democratic party. Recently the party achieved a cooperation agreement with SI--the Socialist International--and the party's representative in Folketing "flipped" over from being affiliated with the SF [Socialist People's Party] group in Folketing to affiliation with the Social Democrats.

People around Jonathan Motzfeldt in the Greenland government are "old friends" from the time when he studied theology at Copenhagen University. Among them are Moses Olsen, Thue Christiansen and Lars Emil Johansen, all of whom have a place in the circle around Motzfeldt.

Rebels

However it is not the bitter and at times quite personal fight between the two big parties that has set off the parliamentary crisis Greenland now finds itself in. The stumbling block is Inuit Ataatigitiit (which can be translated as "People Who Work Together" or "Eskimo Federation"), which unconditionally backs real independence for Greenland.

Paradoxically, IA, which with its rejection of Siumut's EC agreement result, could help to overturn the "red majority" in Greenland. While Atassut feels that Siumut should just turn the reins of government over to Atassut without an election, Siumut and IA agree that the choice should be made by the voters.

The major personality in IA is Arqaluk Lynge, who has a remote past in Siumut. Inuit has two representatives in the Greenland parliament, but in reality it is somewhat underrepresented due to the election system. Inuit received 11 percent of the votes in the last election in Greenland almost a year ago.

No Return

All 10 EC countries gave written approval yesterday in Brussels to Greenland's withdrawal from the European Community at the beginning of next year--and simultaneously approved a fishing agreement in return for an annual EC payment of 216 million kroner to the Greenland treasury.

Due to bad weather in Greenland, government leader Jonathan Motzfeldt could not get to Brussels for the signing ceremony and the agreement will now be brought by plane to Hans Egede's House in Godthab, where Motzfeldt lives and where one of these days he will seal Greenland's final farewell as a valid EC member. Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen signed "with sorrow" on Denmark's behalf: "I would rather have had Greenland remain a member of the Common Market, but it is their democratic right to make this decision," said Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who signed the agreement yesterday along with French Foreign Minister Claude Chaysson and Irish EC Commissioner Richard Burke.

Ellemann-Jensen described the agreement between EC and Greenland as "beneficial to both sides, and especially to Greenland" and "a very generous agreement."

Election Set for 6 June

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Mar 84 Sec III p 3

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] Greenland will have an election in June.

That was the result yesterday of the parliamentary crisis that followed in the wake of the Siumut minority government's negotiations with EC on withdrawal as a member and the granting of fishing rights.

The election was expected, after government leader Jonathan Motzfeldt lost his majority last week when the left-wing party, Inuit Ataatigitiit (IA) presented a motion of no confidence to the home-rule government. The declaration of no confidence got the support of Atassut's 12 members in the Greenland parliament and this gave it majority support.

Atassut, headed by Lars Chemnitz, proposed that the Siumut government resign without an election and make room for an Atassut government, but IA's executive committee thwarted this with a decision that their two members of parliament should support an election--and not back an Atassut government.

The problem for the parliament was that an early election could not be held without a change in the law. The Greenland election law calls for the government to remain in office for 4 years without interruption. But yesterday the government voted unanimously to change the election law, inserting an "upset" paragraph.

Yesterday government leader Jonathan Motzfeldt signed the EC withdrawal agreement in Godthab, Greenland, while his (Siumut) party colleagues stood in respect. Atassut's 12 members remained seated and IA's two members were not present.

It was the conflict over withdrawal from EC that brought down the Motzfeldt government, because both Atassut and IA were dissatisfied with the result--although for different reasons.

Atassut--which is the party backing EC--complained because Siumut did not get more out of the agreement with EC: 216 million kroner a year as "payment" for conceding fishing rights in Greenland waters. IA--a strong EC opponent--complained in particular that the Siumut negotiators were not informed well enough or quickly enough about the agreement with EC.

Now political life in Greenland will continue, either with the Siumut government remaining as an interim cabinet or with the formation of a new interim coalition government until the election on 6 June. The first alternative will probably be the outcome of the discussions the Greenland government is holding today.

6578

CSO: 3613/115

GREENLANDER DESCRIBES SHOCK OF MODERNIZATION FOR SOCIETY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Mar 84 p 11

[Article by Hans Christian Lynge]

[Text] It is hard to be a Greenlander in Greenland and it is hard to be a Greenlander in Denmark. In today's chronicle, a Greenlander who lives in Denmark describes the problems that have accompanied the modernization of Greenland.

Our country, Greenland, is a wonderful land. The scenery is magnificent. Polar bears, fjords with mirror-smooth water and blue-tinged mountains dazzle people with their wide range of hues. They cannot be described in words. But they can and should be experienced.

We have heard similar descriptions of Greenland many times in the past. They make us forget the many serious problems that are mounting day after day, year after year, in modern Greenland as a result of developments that have been much too rapid. But I would still not deny that the scenery in Greenland is beautiful and magnificent, I would just like to say that behind this beautiful and magnificent scenery are hidden pictures that are less attractive.

Greenland was a closed society until World War II. Until then, Greenland was a trapping and fishing society where people lived from day to day. Some 30 to 40 years ago it was quite common for people to live off the land, especially in the northern districts and in small villages. The Greenlanders did not need much money or material goods then and they were quite satisfied with very little. A trapper's family and public employee were quite well-off if the trapper could regularly bring home a couple of seals or small whales to the official and thus receive a regular low wage. This covered food, clothing and pocket money. One could buy the everyday necessities (coffee, tobacco, candy, etc.) in the small local store belonging to the Royal Greenland Trading Company (KGH). The exchange of goods was not great and there was no question of the quantity of material goods that we are family with today in Greenland.

It was a big change for us Greenlanders when the constitution stated in 1953 that Greenland was (as it said) a Danish county. When the constitution went into effect, some people had the idea that Greenland should be industrialized and expanded in order to keep up with developments in Denmark and the rest of the western world. In subsequent years, especially the first 10-20 years, there was a great desire for development that in many ways was implemented in a rapid expansion. Developments went so fast that people did not have time to take a deep breath and think things over before the technical expansion of Greenland was in full swing.

When we look back on conditions in Denmark and other European countries in this context, it took from five to seven generations or longer for people to reach the same stage we are at in Greenland today. It naturally took many mistakes and misunderstandings and even conflicts before they reached the present standard of living, sustained by the country's primary commercial enterprises, fishing and trapping.

This was inevitable, of course, when an effort was made to build up a country like Greenland from a very primitive and backward trapping society to a modern industrialized society of the kind we are familiar with now. Denmark has had the same problems in its transition from a peasant society to the prosperous industrialized society we know today.

To return to the rapid development in Greenland, we are aware that a country cannot be built up with modern means in the space of only 20-30 years, without depriving its people of the opportunity of keeping step. We all know that Rome was not built in a day without mistakes, misunderstandings and conflicts. There are many people in both Denmark and Greenland who feel that we Greenlanders are just spectators to the development of our own country. They say we no longer personally experience this expansion. For example, many Danish skilled workers come to Greenland--in the summer months until just a few years ago--to provide skilled labor in the construction of harbors, housing, the telephone network, institutional and administrative buildings, the traffic system, etc. for us Greenlanders. That is quite natural when the technical development was not accompanied by training enough young Greenlanders to handle the methods (problems) that go along with modern technology as were trained in Denmark, for example. Therefore we Greenlanders did not have to worry too much about the results of the construction carried out by Danish craftsmen. As time went by, we could simply note a lot of strange things that were happening in our own country.

Technical development is a good thing in our country too if Greenland is to keep up with Denmark and the rest of the world and as long as this involves increasing the level of the people's education. In other words, it is the people that need to be built up with the help of modern technology. In this case it is the Greenlanders who have survived as a trapper society for 4-5,000 years of **spartan** Arctic conditions, who must utilize the products (blessings) of technology. But what is happening in Greenland today? We must unfortunately admit that technology is many years ahead of human development.

In a society like Greenland, that does not have much in common with other societies except in technological respects, there are endless discussions and internal conflicts that result in unnecessary misunderstandings.

We all know that Greenlanders and Danes are two vastly different kinds of people who cannot be compared to each other. Today one cannot regard Greenlanders as Danes and vice versa. Greenlanders do not have Danish as their mother tongue. The Greenland way of life is also quite different from the Danish one, even though we are gradually assuming the Danish way of life. The way Greenlanders think and behave cannot be compared with Danish ways either. But Greenlanders were accepted as Danes under the Danish constitution of 1953. I know many Danes who really believe that Greenlanders want very much to become Danes. That is not the case. In recent years Greenlanders have been awakened to realization of the accomplishments of their country and its people and have become aware of their identity and responsibility. Among other things this has led to the introduction of home rule and the taking over of a great many complex tasks. Greenlanders are Danish citizens under the constitution. But we will always be Greenlanders who are part of the Danish nation. Therefore it is reasonable to ask that people in both Denmark and Greenland maintain a clear distinction between the names of the two countries. I have no doubt that quite a few people share this view. It is not necessary to call Greenland North Denmark and Denmark South Denmark when we already have two beautiful names to use. But it is not discriminating against anyone to use the correct names. I know with certainty that most of us Greenlanders are very happy and proud to be called Greenlanders instead of being called North Danes. We Greenlanders do not prefer being North Danes.

The biggest difference between the two peoples (Greenlanders and Danes) lies in the language, of course. The language of Greenland probably sounds like pure gibberish to Danes. That is natural because there are no points of similarity between Greenlandic and Danish. The Greenlandic, Eskimo language is built up of roots and affixes which make the words very long. On the other hand, there are many short words in Danish. Since there are not many similarities/common expressions between Eskimo Greenlandic and Danish, there are great possibilities for misunderstandings. The result of this confusion is that many Greenlanders have a hard time using the Danish language correctly. For example, it is hard for us Greenlanders in Denmark to be exposed to an ironic, lively conversation, as we are quite often. Greenlanders take Danish irony quite literally. If some Dane speaks ironically about us or our country, we often regard this as an expression of dislike. Even if the person does not intend a word of what he is saying as an insult to us or an expression of distaste for our language. People should therefore be careful about speaking ironically to Greenlanders when we have a hard time understanding the Danish language and Danish irony and are at the same time quite sensitive. Unfortunately this often leads to a hostile attitude that does not help anyone. Especially those of us who do not fully master the Danish language. But it should be noted that there are many Greenlanders today who understand written or oral Danish very well,

but when we have to say or write something ourselves, we have trouble expressing ourselves in nuances.

Of course one cannot blame us Greenlanders or the Danes alone, but people on both sides should try to control situations that can arise as a result of irony to the extent this is possible. And of course our familiarity with Danish irony will increase the more Danish we learn.

Viewed with modern eyes, the Greenland society is a very young one. The industrialization of Denmark began around the 1860's and 1870's. But there were already many big and small industries at that time. The rapid industrialization of Greenland requires people in the industrialized areas and this leads to a centralization of the population. Many--unfortunately far too many--unprofitable districts and small villages are vacated for economic reasons. Many people regard it as a big mistake on the part of the Danish Folketing and the Danish government to close down and depopulate a coal-mining town like Qutdligssat, for example, whose 1,300 inhabitants were moved out in 1972 because the town was living on a deficit enterprise from an economic point of view.

What were called open-water towns were created--Pamiut/Frederikshab, Nuuk/Godthab, Manitsoq/Sukkertoppen and Sisimiut/Holsteinsborg--which can be supplied all year round. It is in these communities that the most rapid development has occurred. The result has been that the rural/village people who were used to quite modest conditions for several generations, suddenly arrived in modern towns and had to adjust to large modern conditions. But all of us would have to admit that this is not easy for everyone. In many cases it produces big problems for this population group to come to towns with large tightly-packed modern structures--hospitals, institutions and administrative buildings, schools, hotels--and many other material goods. They do not know many people and are familiar with towns only from pictures in weekly magazines and the like. Their solidarity with people from their own region or community often ends unhappily and they feel inferior to townspeople and regard themselves as onlookers at the development of their own country. Therefore it is not surprising when these people who were forced to move lose their grip. In the country they got along all right, in view of the very difficult hunting and trapping conditions in our country. And of course it is quite hard for them to have any comprehension of the industrialized living conditions of modern townspeople.

We frequently encounter similar feelings among the 6-7,000 Greenlanders who are living in Denmark for the first time. But we are overcoming our beginner's problems, just as Danes managed to do so in the first years after industrialization.

I find it very appropriate to sum up by quoting the following lines by the well-known Greenland Folketing member, Avgo Lynge (1899-1959) who died in the wreck of the "MS Hans Hedtoft" in January 1959. In connection with his demand for better Danish instruction, he said as long ago as 1938:

"At this point all one can say is that Greenlanders are second-class citizens in their own country. Not because this is what the Danes want, but because a people that is not equal in culture, education, etc. is and will remain a second-class group."

6578

CS0: 3613/115

AGREEMENT WITH CIVIL SERVANTS UNION REACHED AFTER YEAR OF TALKS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Mar 84 Sec III p 3

[Text] After more than a year of negotiations the Greenland wage-earner organization, SIK [Greenland Workers Union] and the Public Contract Board, which represents the state, the Greenland home-rule government and the Greenland municipalities, have reached agreement on a new contract for the workers of Greenland. The contract covers most of domestic Greenland public employees, but in practice the rest of the Greenland labor market will follow the contract, which is one of the leanest in many years. Wage increases have been kept within a 2-percent framework as of 1 April 1984, while SIK had asked for 4 percent in the last round, and SIK also had to give up implementation of a security agreement. The contract, which SIK chairman Jens Lyberth described as "not satisfactory, but something we could get in the current situation," is partly a result of political intervention, since the state and the home-rule government had dictated the limits in advance, while at the same time stepping in with respect to cost-of-living adjustments with a zero stance starting at the beginning of the year. The state had originally wanted a suspension of the cost-of-living adjustment, as in Denmark, which led to several weeks of localized strikes in Greenland last fall, after which the government promised to preserve the cost-of-living adjustment--although in curtailed form. But at the same time the workers got an extended vacation.

6578

CSO: 3613/115

SOCIALIST PARTY SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT MEMBERS' APATHY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Mar 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Voter Slump Felt in Social Democratic Party"]

[Text] The Social Democrats have reason to be concerned about the poor turnout for the election of representatives to its party congress. Only 33 percent of the party's members came out to vote while the corresponding figure 4 years ago was still 40 percent.

The SDP leadership is without a doubt pondering the reasons for this apathy. The green debate in the party, which has confused many members, could, for example, have been a partial reason. On the other hand, the selection of candidates was not much different from before. Or could it be that matters are sufficiently satisfactory in the opinion of the party's members.

In analyzing the various reasons the SDP leadership can hardly ignore the fact that at times it gave too much attention to the so-called nonaligned candidates outside of the party in the nomination of candidates, as in the electoral elections of the president. The nonaligned pushed aside numerous candidates faithful to the party in the nomination process, which made the membership feel unimportant. This feeling may still be there.

A lack of participation is in any event a symptom of something that is not quite right. The low voting percentage, for its part, easily results in a strengthening of extreme directions in social movements. Now the party's leftwing seems to have become stronger in many respects. This is in itself understandable since the SDP has received supporters from the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League]. Nevertheless, the question still remains as to whether the representation at the party congress will respect the will of the average party member.

The issue is of even broader significance. A poor turnout can in the worst case reflect that kind of spiritual depression which has been observed even in other parties and in other segments of society. Additional evidence of its existence and prevalence will be obtained in the spring when the leftwing parties and some of the nonsocialist parties vote on candidates for the municipal elections in the fall.

A spiritual depression in society as a temporary phenomenon can contain the seeds of a new upturn. A new upturn should not be kept waiting too long so that the interim does not become a detriment to democracy. Interest in participating depends on the people as well as their leaders even in the life of a political party.

10576

CSO: 3617/110

RURAL PARTY JOINS 'PEACE DEFENDERS' AFTER YEARS OF OPPOSITION

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 1 Mar 84 p 7

[Article by Kaija Lahteenmaa: "Rural Party Wants to Join Peace Defenders"]

[Text] The SMP [Finnish Rural Party] is striving to polish its foreign policy image by once again applying for membership in the Finnish Peace Defenders Organization. Approximately 10 years ago the SMP was not considered to be qualified for membership: it was not considered that the party represented Finland's official Paasikivi-Kekkonen foreign policy line.

But times have changed. The SMP has become a ruling party and in several instances it has made the assurance that it is a steadfast supporter of official foreign policy.

Additional Assurances Needed

But it certainly would not do any harm for the SMP to present additional assurances regarding its foreign policy loyalty. Thus its application for membership in the Peace Defenders can at the same time be interpreted to mean support for official foreign policy.

Indeed, it is being argued in the SMP that the initiative for membership came from the Peace Defenders.

Such talk is being categorically denied in the Peace Defenders.

General Secretary Johannes Pakaslahti of the Peace Defenders says that the organization has never taken the initiative with respect to any party. Not in this instance also.

According to Pakaslahti, the SMP's application for membership is now in the hands of the Peace Defenders where it is being given completely normal consideration: discussions will be held with representatives of the leadership organs of the SMP as well as the Peace Defenders.

A Valuable Channel

Acceptance of the SMP into its ranks may become a delicate question for a part of the Peace Defenders' "rank and file". Grumbling may be heard from

the ranks of the Communist leftwing as well as from those supporting the K-line in the Center Party.

However, membership in the Peace Defenders is probably valuable for the SMP. Indeed, the organization of Peace Defenders represents a channel through which the parties can manage and develop relations with the Soviet Union.

SMP MP Pentti Kettunen was already on a Peace Defenders' mission when the organization's delegation participated in last month's disarmament seminar held in Moscow.

Kettunen's presence was given visible press in the party's paper. It was even announced that the SMP will be represented at the Peace Defenders' next convention, which will be held in March-April.

However, the SMP cannot be present as a party since in such an instance it would have had to join the organization last year already.

A Change of Direction in Attitude

The SMP accomplished quite a reversal in its attitude toward the Peace Defenders.

Even last fall the SMP opposed an increase in appropriations for the Peace Defenders in connection with the compiling the budget.

Chairman Veikko Vennamo of the party's parliamentary faction presented the following argument: the organization of Peace Defenders is not a peace organization since it did not approve the SMP for its membership.

Now, however, the party's application for membership has been submitted to the Peace Defenders.

10576

CSO: 3617/110

BRIEFS

LITERATURE-SMUGGLING TO USSR--Joensuu--Two men, who came from the capital city area, attempted to smuggle religious literature into the Soviet Union from Ilomantsi. The police confiscated a bus that was in the use of the men as well as a stack of literature. The smuggling attempt occurred on 4 March, there is no official border crossing point near Ilomantsi. However, there are several roads in the area for the purpose of transporting wood to the Soviet side. "Apparently, the intent was to transport the literature to the Soviet side by air. The men made one effort to transport the books in a device resembling a balloon," stated Ilomantsi Sheriff Heimo Rissanen. The men were using a bus, which was partially furnished for use as a mobile home also. The men were middle aged and they were detained for the time of the hearing. The bus is owned by one of the men. The men were summoned to appear at the Ilomantsi District Court on 22 March. The Protective Police are investigating the matter [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Mar 84 p 13] 10576

DETAILS OF FRENCH SUPPORT FOR PRO-VIETNAMESE CAMBODIAN GROUPS

Paris AUTRES MONDES in French 26 Jan 84 pp 7-10

[Text] AUTRES MONDES reproduces here, with the kind approval of the editorial office of this magazine, an article from SEREIKA LA VOIX DU CAMBODGE which mentions several associations favorable to the present regime in Phnom Penh, that is to the communists who obey the Vietnamese Communist occupier of their country. The Cambodian Communist Party has been led since December 1981 by Heng Samrin who replaced, on the initiative of the Vietnamese, the Pol Pot administration, the celebrated Khmers Rouges another variety of communists.

For the PC of George Marchais (which is trying to bend French policy in a pro-Vietnamese direction), it is necessary to support the Heng Samrin government. Paul Laurent, secretary of the Central Committee, headed a PCF delegation to Indochina in the spring of 1982. The French Communists stayed in Phnom Penh and Paul Laurent declared on his return: "The idea of Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia is false and untenable." (L'HUMANITE, 29 April 1982). The PC has not changed its point of view since, remaining faithful to its line proclaimed during the entrance of Hanoi's troops in Cambodia. The PC is trying through various channels to develop active solidarity with the Heng Samrin regime and is using for this both the SPF [French Popular Relief] as well as the Union of French Women and other organizations. Thus the SPF has organized many actions (shipments of medicines and various types of supplies) of concrete support to the authorities in Phnom Penh. The objectives of the international communist movement are never lost from view in these measures of a humanitarian nature.

Who are the Pro-Vietnamese Khmers in France?

At the beginning there was only a single association in France to support the Heng Samrin government; it included all the supporters and sympathizers of the regime. As a result of

disagreements between its two main leaders, Kim Vien and Keng Vannsak, this association broke up to produce three movements: ASCODEKA /Association for the Understanding and Development of Cambodia/ of Kim Vien, EC /Cambodian Mutual Aid/ of Keng Vannsak and AAPC /Association for Aid to the Cambodian People/ created by those who did not want to take part in the quarrel. Quite recently a fourth association, UGEKAF /General Association of Cambodians in France/ was created as a result of dissent in the group led by Kim Vien.

1) ASCODEKA, 31, rue Robespierre, 94120 Fontenay-Sous-Bois

President: Kim Vien, doctor of medicine, minister of public health under Lon Nol, came to France before the advent of the Khmers Rouges, reportedly a relative of Hun Sen, Heng Samrin's present minister of foreign affairs.

The number of members allegedly exceeds 100. The association recruits among the Cambodians to whom it has a visa granted for a trip to Cambodia, which follows an itinerary prepared by the officials. On their return, those convinced carry out propaganda in Paris and the provinces where they have been able to infiltrate many cultural associations: Orleans, Tours, Lyon, Besancon, Annecy, and Strasbourg. Moreover, ASCODEKA tries to attract the Khmers living in France, offering to forward letters and packages to their relatives who have remained in Cambodia.

Its media facilities are: a bulletin published irregularly and showing films and slides.

It is the most powerful pro-Phnom-Penh association; it has the power of recommendation to obtain a visa. It is supported by ADRAC /French Association for the Development of Relations with Cambodia/ (P.O. Box 410, 75025 Paris, Cedex 01) near the French PC and which includes among its members Henri Cremieux, Phillipe Devillers, Maurice Lambiotte, Jerome Kanapa (author of a feature very much oriented on Cambodia, recently shown on television)...

2) EC, 16 rue Paul-Messein, 95160 Montmorency.

President: Keng Vannsak, former member of the democratic party, former dean of the faculty of letters in Phnom Penh, last charge d'affaires of the Lon Nol regime in Paris, has not returned to Cambodia since 1975.

Keng Vannsak publishes from time to time a bulletin (PUOT DAY) and pamphlets (Tragedy of a People). He has regular contacts with visitors from the Heng Samrin regime and with ADRAC.

The EC staff seems to be very small

3) AAAPC, 3 Allee Honegger, 95200 Sarcelles

President: Ung Meng Keat, former professor of physics at Phnom Penh, now in a training course (electronics), lived a year under the Khmer Rouge regime.

Secretary general: Tan Vithya, merchant

Secretary (key man of the association): Abdoul Gavousaib, of French nationality by relationship (father native of Pondichery), married to a Vietnamese woman, former lycee student in Phnom Penh, in France since 1975, employed today at the SNCF /French National Railroads/.

The number of members reportedly is 100.

Media facilities: a bulletin, showing films and slides.

The leaders of this association seem to be completely unaware of what is happening inside Cambodia and are very poorly acquainted with the problems of their country.

4) UGEKAF

This association was created officially in August 1983 following a new split which took place in ASCODEKA in the spring of 1983, as a result, it seems, of Kim Vien's authoritarianism.

President: Mao Sras, former peasant, Kammaphibal srok (district chief) under the Khmers Rouges, today a worker at Etampes.

Vice President: Math Ly Roun Skavady, Khmer Islam, obtained a degree in the FRG, today an employee at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. He has not known the Khmer Rouge regime.

Active member (he works on the bulletin): Chea Bun Roeung, he worked in the Cambodian Embassy in Czechoslovakia then in the representation of the Lon Nol regime in Paris, today he is an employee in the Museum of Man. He has not known the Khmer Rouge regime.

Members: These three persons and nine others left ASCODEKA in April 1983. Other persons have joined them later.

Media facility: a bulletin (SAMRACH CHET) formerly ASCODEKA's propaganda organ. It continues to be published by Chea Bun Roeung for UGEKAF, with ASCODEKA changing the name of its bulletin.

The association is also connected with ADRAC.

We can observe that the leaders and active members of the four associations have not suffered under the Khmer Rouge regime, either because they have not known it or because they have been privileged under it.

The cautious commentary given by the magazine SEREIKA about these associations also deserves to be reproduced for it discusses a universal problem.

Should They be Condemned?

The small pro-Heng Samrin groups in France are only a reflection of one aspect of the situation in Cambodia where a fringe of the population apparently accepts collaboration with the Vietnamese occupier. Every country subjected to foreign occupation invariably produces collaborators and traitors which the occupier recruits among opportunists, the misguided and unscrupulous elements. Nevertheless, in the case of Cambodia, the situation is more complex and the opinion about the local helpers of the Vietnamese must be more subtle.

When Hanoi's troops invaded Cambodia in 1979, the country was exhausted and completely disorganized because of the murderous madness of the Khmers Rouges. The survivors had no other solution but compromise with the occupiers to exist, with each one surviving himself at first and helping others, that is the country, to the extent possible. It is in this spirit that many members of the Heng Samrin regime agreed to work under the orders of the Vietnamese. This does not prevent them from remaining basically loyal to their country. Moreover, some aid the resistance by providing it with intelligence or in taking part secretly in sabotage activities. All await the day when the fatherland will be liberated from the Vietnamese occupier, who is at the same time the hereditary enemy. Each one understands that despite the persecution and the vexations, he must remain at his post, for each educated Khmer who flees abroad will be automatically replaced by a Vietnamese, which will only accelerate the process of the Vietnamization of Cambodia.

There are only a handful of genuine traitors. They are, for the most part, old Vietminh Khmers (who no longer resemble a Khmer) and former Khmers Rouges (that is assassins) rescued by Hanoi. Their zeal and their blustering directed by the Vietnamese do not deceive anyone.

Above and below the barriers raised by the occupier, the Khmer people help each other and are united in their desire to preserve

their identity and regain their independence. In this perspective, the pro-Heng Samrin groups in France or elsewhere can play a positive role to the extent that they help to maintain exchanges with the interior of occupied Cambodia and encourage in many ways the undermining work of the resistance. TEP SEREI SEREIKA's study describes the instruments capable of helping the communists in Phnom Penh. The French PC, moreover has its own instruments in this particular field. Regarding ASCODEKA, it refers to ADRAC. Let us examine it closer.

ADRAC--10 rue Baillet--75001 Paris (postal address: P.O. Box 410, 75025 Paris Cedex 01) has as Secretary General Monique Brioudes, whose international activities are varied, since we meet her as "legal observer," accompanied by a PC lawyer, Daniel Voguet, in a CGT delegation conducting an inquiry in Turkey in January 1982. ADRAC started in February 1980, is headed by the communist lawyer, Roland Weyl, director of a propaganda film on Vietnam and leader, among other things, of the Peace Movement (where he appears on the national council) of SPF (he is a member of its national committee) of the France-GDR Association, (he is also on the national committee there). Despite all his responsibilities, the editorial board of REVOLUTION, the weekly of PC intellectuals, considers him among its own. ADRAC's treasurer, Camile Scalabrino is, like its president Roland Weyl, a great friend of the Vietnamese, since he joined the editorial board of VIETNAM, a quarterly magazine on the situation in Vietnam, which favored the Hanoi regime, at the time of the founding of this publication in December 1980.

We can wonder whether ADRAC's leaders do not confuse Cambodia with Vietnam, when we confirm that the association's location corresponds with the address of Pere Yves Buannic, also a militant friend of Communist Vietnam. The CGT VIE OUVRIERE has published its impressions of his stay in Southeast Asia.

Before ADRAC, there was a France-Cambodia Association, which was active at the beginning of the seventies in supporting the Khmers Rouges insurgents. The PC abandoned it after the break between the Khmers Rouges and Vietnam, and the elements not controlled by it had "problems" in continuing it, when the truth began to come out about the atrocities committed by the victors in 1975.

The PC also has another--even more special "transmission belt": The French Committee for Medical and Health Assistance to Cambodia, set up in its initial form in April 1975 by the France-Cambodia Association. Its president is Dr Jean-Yves Follezou, a communist member from Val de Marne. Dr Follezou, when he is not in Cambodia (as in the spring of 1979) carries out missions in the Near East for the Committee for the Protection of

Palestinian and Lebanese Prisoners (in July 1982). It is obvious that this "friend of the Cambodian people" is also a convinced internationalist. He was called in 1980 by one of his colleagues, Dr Dubos, of Doctors Without Frontiers, "a party man" devoted to the implacable exposure of the fascist regimes at the end of our century..."

With the assistance of this Cambodian example, we confirm that the network of associations capable of being used by the international communist movement, starting with the PCF or those obligated to the Phnom Penh government, has a high density.

8490

CSC: 3519/248

OZAL RESPONDS ON MAJOR POLITICAL, LEGAL ISSUES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 12 Mar 84 p 7

[Article by Erbil Tusalp: "Turgut Ozal: Parties Outside of Ours Struggle for Survival"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Aydin - Premier Turgut Ozal arrived in Aydin last night and in the talk he gave in the Municipal Building hall, he disclosed that his words about /Adnan Menderes/ had been turned into a polemic and he said:/"Our respect not only for the deceased Menderes but also for those who worked under him is well known. God willing it will be given to us to put those who serve this country in the positions they deserve."/

On his way to Denizly from Aydin, Ozal stopped in towns and villages to give talks, pleading that because there was /"a convoy of more than 1,000 vehicles behind the bus"/ he did not accept some invitations. Ozal entered the Atmaca borough preceded by a camel. Ozal who was met with demonstrations of affection in Aydin, said in his talks that local elections were /"the first test of domestic policy."/ Ozal also said:/"Parties outside our own are struggling for survival. We will not get 50 but 60% of the mayors. We will obtain the majority of the results. And some street corner scribes will write about 'why it happened that way'."/

During his campaign tour the Premier spoke to journalists.

Question:You are saying:'You will see how we will solve the pardon issue.' You add to your words quotations from talks you had with one of the past premiers, Adnan Menderes. 2 ways are open on this issue from the legal standpoint. One of them is retrial, the other is to change the relevant article in the TCK [Turkish Penal Code]. Which one is the solution?

Answer: I am not sure. The time for this issue will come. This is not what we have on our minds. There are some problems regarding this question.

Question: You say there are no political crimes.

Answer: There are no political crimes.

Question: Does not the content of article 14. of the Constitution indirectly define, in a sense, political crimes?

Answer: You could say that many were sentenced with regard to articles 141 and 142, since articles 141, 142 and 163 define political crimes. This is not the case. In reality these cannot be called political crimes. They are political defeats. They are not crimes. One side wins, another side loses. Those are the odds. When you win you are safe from article 146, when you lose you are imprisoned for betraying your country, trampling on the Constitution.

Question: In your speeches about the opposition you say: 'let them yell their heads off. I will not reply.' If this means not taking the opposition seriously, not accepting the interlocutor, is this not an authoritarian attitude?

Answer: No, no. If there are serious criticisms we give them an answer. There can also be serious criticisms which can come from those who attack us because we do not implement their own program.

Question: According to you how long will the period of transition to democracy last?

Answer: Did we not go on to democracy?

Question: It is not for us to define the period of transition to democracy, it is up to the authorities.

Answer: Pray tell me what you mean by a full return to democracy...

Question: Starting from a full representation in Parliament of the political spectrum, there are many prerequisites to democracy.

Answer: This is not the right way to put it. As others put it, like a liberalization of imports, one should speak of a liberalization in politics. This is the way it should be expressed. It is related to the structure of our society. Take the 1961 constitution. A theoretically well thought out constitution, it could not last.

Question: You had adopted a position regarding the continuation of parties...

Answer: Yes, I have said that in some places parties cannot last, it is sound ideas that last. Somewhere else I also said: "From far back we have been the continuation of the ideas which develop Turkey, make it greater."

Question: How come then ideas continue but not parties?

Answer: Constitutions may not work, parties get outlawed.

Question: Do you have a set period for liberalization?

Answer: This is not something which can be achieved in the middle term. One can take small steps perhaps, but this is not something that can be achieved in 5 or 10 years. Because we have come out of a big upheaval. The environment must be like an unruffled sea.

Question: When the environment is perfectly calm with some shortcomings we get

used to it. We adapt to the shortcomings. For instance, you say there is no such thing as political crime. But at this point offenders are being tried in the Peace Association and the DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Union] lawsuits, and in similar political party trials. What are they being charged with?

Answer: Those are not my own claims. I do not run the tribunals. The accused in those trials are charged in accordance with article 141. There is also article 142. As well as article 146. I can only say this much at this point: when looking back I remember that I had graduated recently. There had been incidents which were called the Sirkeci Palas events. There were the 1950 arrests and even some of our own friends were arrested. They had not done anything really serious. In comparison to the present, one might say they had washed themselves with holy water. In those days they got very heavy sentences. In time, with the 1961 Constitution, the number of those who were condemned for the same crimes greatly diminished. That is to say, 30 to 35 years ago the same laws existed. There were those who were condemned then and there are those who are condemned now. Namely, as long as the laws do not change, neither do the consequences. But perceptions can change in time. This is what I mean by political liberalization. When, subsequently, one falls into extremes this gradual change suddenly disappears.

Question: This kind of issue is not solved by limiting freedoms but by increasing them...

Answer: Of course, you ask the questions and we give the answers. There will be some progress but the main point is not to fall into disputes, not to foment trouble. We cannot discuss this at present but fomenting is going on. One must avoid this. It is human to be caught up in this kind of instigation. Because in the past 5, 10 years we went through an upheaval it has not been possible to sit down and plan those issues. In brief, those are not short term tasks...

12278

CSO: 3554/187

ULMAN ASSESSES 'ANATOMY' OF TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTE

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 12 Mar 84 p 8

[Article by Haluk Ulman in The Column "From A Window On the World": "The Anatomy of A Dispute"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Turkey and Greece are 2 neighboring countries condemned by history and geography to live side by side... Furthermore, they both took their place in the Western World after World War II with political, economic and military ties. They are both members of the Council of Europe and of NATO; Greece has recently joined the European Economic Community and Turkey is waiting for its turn to arrive.

In spite of this, many issues come between those 2 nations. Because of those issues which are related to the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, time after time they find themselves at odds. In fact, as was the case last week, they fall prey to tensions which blow the winds of war.

Agreement as well as disagreement are natural between neighbors. But why is it that the misunderstandings between Turkey and Greece cannot be solved by talks? Why do they go on endlessly? And why do those 2 nations go through constant crises? The simplest answer to those questions is distrust. Neither of those 2 nations can trust the other, they eye each other with fear.

This fear has its roots in history. Both countries achieved their autonomy at the end of the independence wars they waged against each other; they are unable to forget what happened in those times. The shadow of the past causes words like /"Greek tyranny," "The Great Idea"/ or /"Turkish expansionism,"/ to be hurled at every occurrence; as if with every dispute an attempt to deal out again the old trump cards was made. This being the case, it becomes very difficult to settle the disputes within their own dimensions and framework and to attempt to solve them within that framework.

Furthermore the status quo which arose in the Aegean after World War II is another factor of distrust. As is known, after that war the balance in the Aegean which had been established in Lausanne, was altered, the Aegean Sea has come to a great extent under Greek authority and rule. Turkey, as an Aegean nation, now wants a fairer share of that sea. While Greece views this claims as expansionism and remains adamant about any agreement that might change the status quo. On the contrary, it tries to maximize it for its own benefit.

This attitude on the part of Greece causes Turkey to fear that there is an attempt to turn the Aegean into a "Greek Sea." Indeed, when recalling the stance of Athens regarding the Aegean continental shelf, territorial waters, FIR limits and the islands' aerial space, it is not possible to look on this fear as being unjustified. While the present move to fortify islands which according to international treaties should have been cleared of armaments, by pointing to an inclination to support "faits accomplis" with force, deepens this fear even more.

On the other hand, Greece is beset by the fear that Turkey will attempt to realize its claims, its aims, through force. It believes in fact that the the "faits accomplis" intended to change the status quo will come from Turkey. It views the status quo as its own /"right"/ and does not even think of the possibility that this might /"not be right [just]"/ for Turkey.

It appears that it would be rather difficult, for a variety of reasons, to establish in the Aegean a new order that would /"right"/ not only for Greece but for Turkey as well.

First, neither the Turkish nor the Greek government is ready to face the reactions of public opinion which an agreement based on /"give and take"/ that is, which will require mutual obligations, might cause. Quite on the contrary, they see the perpetuation of irreconcilable positions as a factor in uniting public opinion behind them. It should be said that today this is more applicable to Greece, or rather to Papandreou.

In truth, the greatest obstacle to a Turkish-Greek agreement on the entire Aegean is Papandreou. The Greek premier's imperious, intractable and showy personality, his political tendencies based on a /"crisis diplomacy"/ are getting him into trouble not only with Turkey but with the entire West. The display of toughness he attempted to make by presenting as factual an occurrence that never took place may not be the last example but it is a good case in point. This kind of behavior leads to the destruction of the /"credibility"/ of Greece as well as that of Papandreou. But then Greeks are not famed for their faithfulness to the agreements they make, to the signatures they sign. Turkey has suffered this sort of thing for 10 years in Cyprus. As for the Turkish Cypriots, they have been living with it from 1960 to the present day.

Another factor that makes it harder to settle the disputes between Turkey and Greece through talks is the support from Western nations which back Athens. Greece, which relies on that, instead of seeking an understanding looks for ways to impose on Turkey its own wishes and aims. And in order not to be deprived of this backing, it hopes to derive special benefits from ongoing tensions.

When examined dispassionately, this is the anatomy of the Turkish-Greek dispute...

12278

CSO: 3554/187

VREVEN ON MILITARY BUDGET, LENGTH OF SERVICE

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 1 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Roger Rosart: "Mr Vreven Foresees Possibility of Paid Lengthening of Military Service"]

[Text] The term of military service remains fixed at 10 months in Belgium and 8 months in West Germany, according to a statement made Wednesday by minister Vreven as he submitted his budget for 1984 to the senate commission on national defense. However, since the total strength of the short-term volunteers during the next three years (with the exception of officers and NCO's) will be progressively reduced, without discharges, from 28,000 to 25,500, it is anticipated that the members of the national guard will be offered the opportunity of extending their service from two to four months as short-term salaried personnel. A longer term will be anticipated for national guardsmen of the paracommando regiment (10 months of service and 5 months as salaried personnel) to answer the ever-increasing demand for the services of this unit.

It is interesting to note that, in the opinion of the minister of the Interior, the release of 1,900 volunteers in 1985 and of an additional 1,100 in 1986 will create a need of 43,966 and 46,188 national guardsmen respectively for these years, instead of 40,128 as is the case today, including 2,600 officer candidates and reserve NCO's. Now, according to the present rules on exemptions and because of the shrinkage in population, the number of young people available would be no more than 38,300 in 1985 (that is, a shortfall of 5,666) and 36,950 in 1986 (that is, a shortfall of 9,238). Besides, the decline in the birthrate will result in a difference of 25 percent when compared with the troop levies of 1983 and 1984. If it is the duty in general of the minister of the Interior to attend to the needs of the contingent, his colleague in the department of National Defense intends to improve the situation of the national guardsmen. In Belgium (10 months of service) they will have at their disposal a voucher for free transportation (between their homes and the garrison) once a week instead of every two weeks. Their pay (75 francs per day per soldier, 100 francs after 6 months of service) will be doubled in the garrisons of Ludenscheid, Siegen, Werl, Arnsberg, Neheim and Soest and tripled in the other German garrisons in the east southeast. Even an

adjustment in pay is anticipated. Finally, "to give the men something to do during the periods when their duties are light, due in part to the lack of means with which to conduct operations, a program of social, cultural or physical activities is envisaged."

For career personnel, the minister envisages a 38-hour week instead of one of 40 hours (as prevails in the other sectors of public service, including the police) and the abolition of furlough compensations, entailing the institution of a system of lump sum compensation per 24 hours depending on the locale and intensity of services rendered. In Germany, compensation for service at distant points will be increased by one DM [German mark] per day in zone II (on the other side of the Rhine) and by two DM in zone III.

Of a 1984 budget of 99,771,000 (up 6.40 percent as compared with 1983), that is, 5.5 percent of the national budget as compared with 7 percent in 1975, personnel expenditures will amount to 48,759,000 (up 5.02 percent and 48.9 percent of the budget), operational expenditures will go to 26,274,000 (up 4.89 percent and 26.3 percent of the budget) and investment outlays to 24,738,000 (up 10.97 percent and 24.8 percent of the budget).

Of this total budget, 49.6 percent is earmarked for the ground force and 25.8 percent for the air force. For the ground forces, operational credits will make possible 22.6 days of standard training of the 45 recommended by the Mixed Commission and the 60 recommended by NATO. For the air force, 118 hours of flying time are anticipated, whereas the Mixed Commission and NATO recommend 180 and 240 hours respectively. For the naval force, the credits are for 83 days of navigation for one-third of the fleet, whereas the Mixed Commission has set a standard of 83 days for one-half of the fleet and NATO also recommends 110 days for one-half of the fleet. In the judgment of the minister: "Training cannot drop below present levels without causing grave detriment to the credibility of the Belgian armed forces and undermining the motivation of the military personnel."

In view of the situation today, the minister of course did not neglect the "community" aspect of equipment and investment expenditures nor fail to recall that on 1 August 1983, the Council of Ministers set industrial compensations connected with the 10-year plan (transport, HF and VHF radio, artillery and helicopters) as follows: from 54 to 56 percent for the Flemish region, from 34 to 36 percent for the Walloon region and from 9 to 10 percent for the Brussels region.

8089

CSO: 3619/44

DOMESTIC AVIATION INDUSTRY AIDED BY HAWK COUNTERPURCHASE DEAL

Helsinki HELSINGIN SAUOMAT in Finnish 6 Mar 84 p 21

[Article by Jyri Raivio: "Trade Generated by Hawk Aircraft Procurement"]

[Text] The counterpurchases generated by the Finnish arms deal of the century are coming to a close. After a halting start success exceeded expectations.

In the final days of 1977 the Defense Ministry concluded an agreement with the English British Aerospace Company on the purchase of 50 Hawk jet training aircraft for the Finnish Air Force. The cost of the transaction was 965 million markkaa in 1977 money without any index increases.

The contract included a stipulation by which the seller was obligated to arrange 100-percent reciprocal purchases for the buyer. British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce, the manufacturer of the engines for the Hawk aircraft, both of which are state-owned corporations, thus agreed to arrange new exports for Finnish industry at a value corresponding to 965 million markkaa.

In a few weeks Assistant State Secretary Ake Wihol's compensation committee will close the books forever on the Hawk compensation transactions and will submit a report to the government and parliament on the accomplishment of the reciprocal purchase obligation.

This report is being compiled with a hint of a smile in the permanent counterpurchase committee appointed by the cabinet. The Hawk procurement, which has been called the Finnish arms deal of the century, has generated Finnish counterpurchases of the century.

Wihol's committee records the following important figures of the Hawk reciprocal purchase balance: after indexing and changes in the value of money the final value of the Hawk deal will be approximately 1.2 billion markkaa. The accumulated value of approved counterpurchases is 1.5 billion markkaa. Thus the 100-percent counterpurchase requirement has been exceeded and the final percentage will be approximately 115.

Wihtol: We Are Opposed in Principle

When the Hawk agreement was being negotiated and when it was concluded at the end of 1977, Paavo Rantanen of the Foreign Ministry was the highest ranking official approving the reciprocal purchase package. Pauli Opas, who is now the ambassador in Tokyo, came after him in the leadership of the compensation committee. Wihtol's involvement in this matter is relatively recent, only in the last few months.

In spite of the changes of officials and diligent counterpurchase work, the attitude in principle of Finland's foreign trade officials toward counterpurchase or compensation requirements has been, is, and will apparently always be negative.

According to Wihtol, compensation agreements are not compatible with the principle of free trade being carried out in Finland and they are not appreciated in other industrialized countries. In the conduct of civilian trade our foreign trade officials have adopted a negative attitude toward compensation agreements in theory as well as in practice.

The large procurements by the defense forces, however, comprise an exception to this noble principle of free trade here and elsewhere in the world. The demand for compensation in their connection is an established practice, which we intend to continue even in the future.

According to Wihtol, after the fulfillment of the Hawk reciprocal purchase obligation the permanent compensation committee appointed by the Defense Ministry will shepherd nearly a dozen other counterpurchase packages attached to defense equipment procurements. Some of them are quite small. According to Esko Hamilo, division chief and secretary of the committee, a counterpurchase has been attached to even a 2-million markka procurement agreement. However, in the future Wihtol will consider a 50-million markka defense equipment deal as the lower limit for a counterpurchase requirement.

Counterpurchases were part of the picture already in the initial phase of the Hawk procurement or from the time that the Air Force began to study new training aircraft alternatives for replacing the aging Fouga Magister jet aircraft.

Beginning Was Difficult

In the final selection there were five aircraft from just as many countries, and in addition to the suitability of their equipment to the Finnish Air Force, those making the offer also presented opportunities for benefiting Finland's industry by means of counterpurchases.

The final selection was made in 1976. The most important argument was the suitability of the type of aircraft, but promises of counterpurchases also played an important role.

The manufacturer of the Hawk, which was at that time still called Hawker Siddeley before the comprehensive merger of Britain's aircraft industry, was one of the most active on this front. In fact, it was so active that we even took the risk of disregarding a few of the conditions established by the cabinet for concluding the final trade agreement.

In giving the Defense Ministry the authority to work out the Hawk procurement contract the cabinet, you see, assumed that the matter of compensation would be finalized before concluding the final procurement contract. The contract was concluded at the end of 1977, but less than one-third of all the counterpurchases was finalized at that time.

The three-man ministerial group of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] proposed that the whole procurement question be renegotiated on this basis, but in vain. The defense minister at that time, Taisto Tahkamaa (Center Party), affixed his signature to the document on 30 December 1977.

Three Years Were Not Sufficient

For the purpose of counterpurchases British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce established a one-man office, which in cooperation with Machinery, the Finnish agent of the British firms, began to work on accomplishing the goal. It was calculated that it would take 3 years to accumulate a 100-percent compensation.

The Finnish side in the counterpurchase organization was represented by the Defense Ministry's compensation committee. It examined all the transactions offered as counterpurchases and attempted to make certain that so-called traditional Finnish exports would not slip into the quotas intended for this new export trade. According to Wihtol, very few differences arose in this respect.

The accomplishment of the stipulations of the agreement went quite slowly in the initial phase. A definite turn occurred in the spring of 1979 when Rauma-Repola sold a maintenance platform for oil drilling rigs worth nearly 500 million markkaa to England as a Hawk counterpurchase. This one-time transaction nearly fulfilled all of British Aerospace's counterpurchase obligation and amounted to three-fourths of the total compensation package.

Nevertheless, the original 3-year goal was not sufficient even for British Aerospace. Its share was completed in June 1981. Even though Rolls-Royce's share was much smaller, the engine manufacturer needed an additional year and did not fulfill its own share until the summer of 1982.

Nevertheless, Hawk compensations continue to be entered into the books. According to Wihtol, this was done at the request of the seller so that counterpurchases could be placed in reserve in the event of possible future needs.

Thus the books are only now being closed and the Hawk counterpurchases are considered to be accomplished. Nevertheless, a completely final compensation percentage cannot even yet be calculated since it will not be possible to

quote the exact price of the Hawk procurement by the Air Force until the last aircraft is delivered next year.

Transactions Generated by Hawk

At least until the final report of the compensation committee is submitted to the government and to parliament the details of these counterpurchases will remain behind the red tags on Division Chief Hamilo's chart. However, some examples have been disclosed.

The largest single counterpurchase was the maintenance and rescue platform built by Rauma-Repola for the oil drilling fields. It was ordered in the spring of 1979 and was delivered in November 1982. The client was a British firm by the name of Seaforth Marine and the final price of the platform rose to nearly 500 million markkaa according to Rauma-Repola.

Hamilo considers the computer forms transaction concluded by the Turku firm Polytypos as a good example of permanent trade relations arising from Hawk compensations. According to Veikko Salo, the firm's export director, exports began in 1977, or in other words Polytypos was one of the first firms to benefit from Hawk compensations. The purchaser was Rolls-Royce, with which the firm already has its third 3-year contract.

The business begun with Rolls-Royce has resulted in the creation of a marketing firm for Polytypos in England, 15 employees, 1,000 clients, and last year deliveries amounted to 22 million markkaa. The share held by Polytypos in the Hawk counterpurchase package is approximately 120 million markkaa.

Valmet or the Finnish aviation industry approached the Hawk counterpurchases with more optimistic goals. However, its share has remained at 10 percent, which primarily consists of the assembly of the aircraft and their Adour engines and partial manufacturing operations at Valmet's Kuorevesi and Linnavuori plants. Valmet is a subcontractor of British Aerospace in the assembly of the Hawk. The aircraft assembled at Kuorevesi are delivered to British Aerospace, which in turn delivers them to the Finnish Air Force.

The list of firms which have been included in counterpurchase arrangements is long. Salora has sold televisions, Kone Jyry landfill rollers, Navire marine engineering equipment. Even Valco managed to be included in these compensation transactions by delivering picture tubes to England within its framework.

In the final balance the metal industry and electronics were responsible for 70 percent of the total Hawk compensation package, the forest industry received 15 percent, and the aviation industry or Valmet 10 percent. The remaining 5 percent was divided among various areas of production.

The overwhelming share of deliveries went to England even though deliveries to third-party countries by the British were also accepted as compensation. They, however, only amounted to approximately one-tenth of all the counterpurchases.

Committee's Work Continues

Wihtol attributes the success of the Hawk compensations to the seller side. British Aerospace as well as Rolls-Royce are large corporations whose own purchasing power is vast. In addition, the organization created by them turned out to be quite effective.

The compensation committee's experience with counterpurchase efforts in connection with the second aircraft procurement by the Air Force was not as good. Counterpurchases worth 20 million dollars or more than 110 million markkaa with respect to the three Learjet towing aircraft have been accomplished in a painstakingly slow manner. We are already into a second continuation phase and less than one-fifth of the goal has been met according to Hamilo.

Wihtol considers the reason for the Learjet difficulties to be an organization that differs from the Hawk compensation system. The firm manufacturing the Learjet aircraft gave its counterpurchase obligation to the large American ICEC firm, which conducts trade primarily in raw materials and agricultural products. It has not even come close to the results achieved by the one-man Hawk compensation office set up by the British.

In addition to the Learjet transaction, Wihtol's counterpurchase committee will account for counterpurchases for fewer than 10 other procurement deals in the next few years. Additional commissions are forthcoming. The Air Force is purchasing used Drake destroyer aircraft from Sweden and Wihtol's committee has already held preliminary discussions on counterpurchases for this transaction.

10576

CSO: 3617/110

BRIEFS

ARMS SALES FOR 1983--The minister of foreign trade confirmed Thursday that France, which ranks as the third arms exporter in the world, last year sold war materiel "classified as confidential" valued at 28.1 billion francs (3.5 billion dollars). The level reached in 1982 was 26.1 billion francs. Actually, French arms sales were definitely in excess of what these figures indicate, since the latter do not include exports of materiel not "classified as confidential," but which cannot be itemized in detail because no public statistical report provides the necessary information. In all, French arms sales probably rose to a value of 35 billion in 1982, according to well-informed sources. According to French Minister of Defense Charles Hernu, orders for war materiel submitted to France by foreign countries (two-thirds from North Africa, the Near East and the Middle East) had gone up to 41.6 billion francs in 1982, as compared with 37.5 billion in 1981. The deliveries were sometimes scheduled to be made over a period of several years. According to the statistics of the Foreign Trade ministry, France last year imported 6.8 billion worth of military materiel "classified as confidential" (6 billion in 1982), thus clearing a positive balance of 21.3 billion francs, its second trade surplus after cereals (25.1 billion francs). Arms sales will no doubt represent, in 1983, the first French surplus. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 2 Mar 84 p 6] 8089

CSO: 3519/255

DEFENSE MINISTER ASKS ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR SUB HUNT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Feb 84 p 27

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad advocates the additional allocation of 120 million kroner to make Norwegian frigates better able to combat submarines. These funds are in addition to the 220 million already allocated to modernize the frigates. The extra funds will be used primarily to modernize the 20 year old surveillance equipment the frigates now have. Undersecretary Erik Senstad of the Defense Ministry told this to AFTENPOSTEN.

Hunting for a submarine is about like looking for a needle in a haystack. With the equipment the navy now has, it is practically an impossible task unless they are extremely lucky.

The inspector general of the navy Rear Adm Bjarne Grimstvedt, through the commander in chief, has informed the defense minister that the navy's ability to detect submarines will be practically nonexistent by the late eighties unless the reconnaissance equipment of escort vessels is improved beyond what already has been allocated by parliament.

As a result, Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad now has proposed allocating an additional 120 million kroner to upgrade sonar equipment on the frigates. This sum would be paid out from 1984 to 1987 and would come from a redistribution of funds and a transfer of funds from the operating budget. This 120 million would be added to the 220 million kroner already earmarked for modernizing Norway's five frigates.

The inspector general of the navy will make recommendations as to how the 120 million kroner will be used. It could be used to purchase hull-mounted sonars, variable depth sonars, or special equipment for locating submarines lying still on an uneven seabed. It also could be possible to equip helicopters with sonar or antisub equipment.

9336

CSO: 3639/83

NORWEGIAN UNDERWATER WARFARE EXPERTS ON MINISUBS OFF SWEDEN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Mar 84 p 9

[Article by Rolf L. Larsen]

[Text] A minisub can withstand enormous explosive pressures before being destroyed or taking on water. In shallow waters such as in the archipelago near Karlskrona a minisub is like a tank. It can withstand explosions as powerful as a mine dropped just 6 or 7 meters from the submarine. The divers on-board can remain underwater for long periods of time. They can receive messages from stations on land and from the mother ship. The divers also can leave and return to the submarine with no technical problems.

AFTENPOSTEN received this information from Norwegian military and civilian underwater experts. The submarine hunt in Sweden is being followed with great interest by experts in Norway and around the world. For this reason, AFTENPOSTEN has discussed several important topics of underwater warfare and diving medicine with military and civilian experts, in connection with the recent events in the Karlskrona archipelago.

Extremely Shallow Depths

First of all, the experts said that if minisubs are operating in these waters the submarine hunt is occurring at extremely shallow depths. The sea region that has been blockaded is about 20 km long and 4 or 5 km wide. The greatest depths in these waters are about 20 meters. The average depth is 10 to 15 meters.

"A minisub of this type is like a tank at such shallow depths. It can withstand explosive forces of about 300 kg at a distance of 6 or 7 meters from the sub without being seriously damaged. This is the same charge as that contained in a mine," the experts said.

Rescue Subs

Some information is available today on the minisubs of other countries. The Swedes also have such a minisub. It is a so-called rescue vessel for submarines. The vessel weighs 52 tons and can dive to 460 meters to assist submarines that are in distress. This minisub can accommodate 25 people.

Other rescue subs can go much deeper. They can dive to 1,500 to 2,000 meters and withstand extremely high pressures. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have rescue submarines of this type. It is believed that minisubs developed from these small submarines are now operating in Swedish waters.

"They are operating at shallow depths and are subjected to minimal underwater pressure. As a result, they can withstand extremely high pressures, for example from underwater charges. These submarines also have another great advantage: they are small. They are only about 10 meters long and 2 or 3 meters in circumference. They weigh from 30 to 50 tons and have a crew of three to five. The larger the crew on board, the shorter the time they can remain underwater," the submarine experts said.

"The limiting factor is the amount of oxygen on board. If there is sufficient oxygen and a good air purification system on board, the vessels can remain underwater for a long time. The minisubs can remain 'passive' and silent on the seabed. They can be equipped with both diesel engines and batteries. In the 'passive' state, however, they can turn off both the diesel engine and the batteries and let special fuel cells produce the modest amount of power required. This is accomplished through a special chemical process that produces neither noise nor exhaust."

The experts with whom AFTENPOSTEN spoke continued: "When the sub is at just 20 meters, the crew can leave the sub and go to the surface with ordinary diving equipment and return to the vessel. Advanced military diving equipment is used so that no bubbles appear at the surface from divers at this depth. The submarine also has a 'sluicing mechanism' that produces no bubbles. The divers probably are 'sluiced' in and out of the minisub in this system."

Communications

"The minisubs can also send and receive messages while underwater. At a depth of 20 meters, this can occur in two ways. They can receive messages at extremely low radio frequencies at long distances. It is possible, for example, to send messages to the submarine from large land-based stations in all the countries around the Baltic Sea basin. In addition, the minisubs can receive sound signals from ships in the vicinity. If these signals are to reach the minisub, there must be a direct 'line of sight' in a reasonably straight line underwater between the two vessels. Communications of this type can occur only over short distances. Thus, for example, there may be no islands or rocks between the minisub and the mother ship. A third possible means of communication is 'ordinary' radio. In this case, the minisub must surface and use an antenna to receive the 'ordinary' radio signals."

Difficult Hunting

The military experts with whom AFTENPOSTEN spoke stressed that the conditions for underwater hunting in the Swedish waters are extremely difficult. "The area is shallow and has a difficult topography. Water flows into the area from rivers in the vicinity and parts of these waters are covered with ice. All this

makes it extremely difficult to use sonar from the surface to hunt submarines in this area. This also makes it difficult for one minisub to find another. With the minisubs so small and the waters so difficult, it is often like looking for a needle in a haystack."

"For this reason, the Swedes use well known tactics in the hunt. They stall for time. At the same time, they explode charges in the area. The sound and shock waves are extremely powerful. This can frighten the crew of the minisub, keep them awake, and destroy their working conditions. This also means that the minisub cannot remain 'passive' on the seabed. It must change positions and, thus, it may be detected. This increases the chances of encircling the submarine. On the other hand, the continuous bombing and shooting in the sea makes it impossible to see or hear the submarine. Hunting submarines is time-consuming. If the Swedes have managed to block off all the narrow and shallow passages in the region and can keep the submarines within this area, it is more likely that the submarines finally will be located and brought to the surface," the military experts said.

9336

CSO: 3639/83

DEFENSE PLANNERS CRITICIZED FOR AVOIDING REALITIES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Mar 84 p 12

[Article: "Hard Times Require New Defense Plans"]

[Text] "We are attempting to implement defense plans without the economic prerequisites for carrying them out." This was stated by administrative director Ronald Bye in a speech to the Oslo Military Society yesterday. Bye, who was chairman of the Defense Commission of 1974, stressed that Norway must choose one of two alternatives: allocating enough money to carry out the recommendations of the commission or adopting a new defense concept that could be adjusted to reflect economic reality.

"I strongly recommend the first alternative, but I fear it will be impossible to carry out. Obviously, our defense must adapt itself to the economic realities of our society--which will become more and more severe for a long time to come. In addition, I believe it is impossible at present, from a political standpoint, to allocate more funds for defense," Bye said. He concluded by saying that a new defense concept must be introduced.

"This will not require a new Defense Commission, but a simple committee that can produce a new defense structure in a brief time. The new structure should be based on simplification and a shift of emphasis among the branches of the armed forces and between standing forces and reserves. Our investments in weapons technology also must be adjusted. As chairman of the National Council of the Home Guard, I would like to point out, as an example, the fact that it is both possible and reasonable to shift some emphasis from the army to the home guard. A heavier investment in the home guard is not military romanticism, but a way to increase our defense capabilities in a more reasonable and simple manner."

"I believe a new defense concept has two requirements. The new concept should not cost significantly less than the amount we are now spending, but it should be a new and better way to invest the same amount of money (present allocations should remain unchanged) in order to achieve at least the same defense capabilities. The 'simplified' defense system also will require a serious effort toward joint NATO defenses. What we receive in return from our NATO allies will be decisive in the new division of responsibilities resulting from a simplified concept of our Norwegian defense system," Ronald Bye said in his speech.

THORN ON AGRI-CULTURE, BUDGETS, SUMMITS

Brussels 12 Mar 84 : 5

[Article by Yves Benoit, Haroun Labaki and Benedicte Vaes: "Thorn: At the Summit We Will Liquidate... Where It Counts"]

[Text] Will it succeed or won't it? Bets are open on the chances of success of the European summit to be held next 19-20 March in Brussels following on the resounding failure in Athens.

President of the European Commission Gaston Thorn refused to bet. Evaluating the trump cards the Ten will have up their sleeves at the opening of the great European show, he simultaneously raised the specters of a "happy ending" and a catastrophic scenario.

"This time," Gaston Thorn said to us, "the Ten are well-informed: They won't try to solve problems while ignoring their causes, unaware of the other fellow's problems. No one has ever gone to so much trouble to prepare a summit as Francois Mitterrand, the current president of the EC Council.

The president has incurred risks in placing his entire prestige in the balance. He has done everything to create awareness in his partners: "I think that this time we'll have a better chance of succeeding because exhaustion of the community's budget prohibits us from indefinitely putting off deadlines.

Moreover, it won't be any easier in June than in March because the elections to the European Parliament will take place between these two summits. And the Ten will be less willing to make those sacrifices it would not agree to make today during an election period."

What can we expect of this last chance meeting? Gaston Thorn was explicit: "This summit will not be the one that produces economic recovery. At best we'll liquidate the problems of the past. We must clear the table of agricultural and financial cases. This is the indispensable condition for later being able to launch a recovery. So between March and June the ministers could tighten things up and formulate decisions."

The Dynamics of Success

So Gaston Thorn envisions a June summit that might concern itself with the Europe of the second generation. Particularly with a strengthening of the European monetary system: "I think," he said, "that even the English will go along with it."* And with new policies: "As some are saying, Europe must not be made only for farmers and developing countries, but must involve all occupational categories."

By way of example, Gaston Thorn cited "Esprit," the program for research on information technologies. Conceived by the European Commission and the private sector, this program received the backing of the governments 10 days ago. "We wanted to get out of a dynamics of failure and return to one of success. Hence, step by step, we ought to develop more ambitious projects in the fields of energy, data processing, biotechnology, etc.."

Gaston Thorn is even more ambitious and he was far from being ready to protest when we raised the possible role of the commission in the debate on the initiation of a Europe of defense or security: "The commission," he replied, which is a political institution, must be able to say anything. I've often said that there is a threshold of economic integration which cannot be crossed without realising our common destiny, a political integration, which in turn cannot be achieved without common views on security or defense.

"This is an old pet subject of mine: From antiquity to our times there is no example of a community that has been forged without its being prepared to defend itself. How can we demand more sacrifices of Europeans in terms of employment or money for the good of other Europeans if they can't defend what they have in common? Defense that one entrusts to others no longer works."

Outside NATO or inside NATO? That is not the issue for Gaston Thorn, who simply feels that the Ten must begin to discuss their defense and their security together.

Patching Things Up Impossible

After painting an optimistic picture of the community's future, the president of the commission raised the hypothesis of a failure in Brussels. "It will be the one or the other," he confided to us. "Patching things up is impossible. The wound is too deep to apply a bandage. It's unthinkable for us to send the wounded man home so that he won't die in the hospital. If the March summit fails, there'll be an overt crisis." So?

"We have to do what we've neglected to do for 3 years now: hold a great conference among the 10 nations to define the kind of community we want, to dissipate the haziness. So we would have to stand up and be counted to see which partners no longer want to go on with it. It would be the moment of truth."

* Great Britain and Greece are not members of the E.C.

For Gaston Thorn failure in March would not mean the end of the community, but "perhaps agonizing revisions."

A green Europe will be the key item on the Brussels summit agenda. At the moment it absorbs two-thirds of the European budget while producing more and more unmarketable surpluses. "The common agricultural policy," Gaston Thorn said, "which was a success up until a few years ago, now runs the risk of leading to its own death. There is not a single example in any economy in the world, especially at a time when the competition is getting fierce, that proves that you can get out of difficulties by producing three times the demand at twice the normal price. Here we run up against incomprehension on the part of the agricultural world."

"The European Commission wants to preserve the essence of a green Europe. Of course, the number of farmers will continue to drop. What is unfortunate about this is the fact that this will be happening at a time when the unemployment situation is such that a shift to other sectors cannot easily be made. As in the steel industry, we should have restructured a long time ago. The physical limit of the agricultural policy was reached when we began to produce surpluses for which we could find no customers either inside or outside the EEC."

What sort of solution? Gaston Thorn proposed the establishment of a price policy that would serve to support the incomes of medium-scale farmers. But special assistance would be provided for the smallest farmers as well as for disadvantaged or rural fringe areas, in the mountains, for example. "As for those who want to produce more in terms of industrial crops," Gaston Thorn went on, "let them do so at their own risk and peril, without any price guarantees and submitting to economic laws."

Truck Drivers to the Rescue!

While a green Europe directly involves only 8 percent of the community's citizens, these past few weeks the general public has bitterly realized the limits of European integration since the blockading of borders by customs officials and truck drivers. "I wouldn't dare say that I'm happy about it....," Gaston Thorn let slip. And then he added: "This truck drivers' strike has probably produced a lot of publicity for the European Commission. It has demonstrated that we still have far too many customs officials."

"Now or never is the time to try to maximally limit border inspections, to create single customs inspection points between any two EEC countries, to make only spot checks, to make traffic more fluid."

Actually, these proposals are not new. But the roads of Europe had to be blockaded for the different capitals to listen to the commission. "They go back," Gaston Thorn sighed, "to the time I told them that the Common Market has not been achieved...."

The president of the commission appeared to be delighted to have been able to incorporate his action into a popular attitude: "We must," he said, "take

advantage of fuses that blow in some places. When conflicts arise, however, the commission, are goldsmiths in that domain." And he went on: "If governments have nothing but one constant cause for concern, to be re-elected, if they have the impression that people are gnashing their teeth, that those who have elected them are going to blame them for something, they begin to act. This is where the commission is in line with the way people feel." Then he cited another example, the acid rain issue, when, thanks to public opinion, the commission was able to "arouse enthusiasm in Mr. Kohl."

Violation of Treaties

This desire to be popular led Gaston Thorn to raise the possibility of a commission president election by universal suffrage. "I'm not anxious for that, this since I'm at the end of my term in office." Mr. Thorn added: "This election, this legitimization would go hand in hand with what the European parliament is asking for, a strengthening of the commission's powers."

As for the immediate future, the president spoke in favor of a return to the orthodoxy of the Treaty of Rome, that is, to the commission's power to make only proposals: "If the commission no longer has the power to assume the initiative, it will no longer be an administration, a secretariat. The small countries should take heed of this for, under the circumstances, they would be the first to be affected. The future commission will no longer be able to play its role if treaties are violated."

Gaston Thorn did not mince words, particularly as regards the direction summits were and were been taking. "We must never again go back down to the level of the most technical problems, speak of milk, cows, calves, as we did in Athens — only to end up with a failure. The chiefs of state and government have not found themselves in that position again!" According to the president, the only usefulness of European summits is in establishing the major options: European recovery, the Parliament's powers, the majority vote, etc.. Furthermore, he asserted that the multiplication of summits has authorized a harmful confusion of responsibilities. He explained: "Ministers pass the big problems to the summits, the little problems to officials and between the two they complicate everything. Recently," Gaston Thorn related, "I visited the chief of government, who said to me: 'But why are my ministers always off on trips?'"

And lastly, the president concluded: "The day the unanimous vote was generalized, the commission was weakened because they didn't negotiate about it. Then, because there no longer were decisions, because the nations were, in turn, made proposals, because the role of the national presidents of the EC had been exaggerated. We must return to the majority vote."

THE
END

TEXT OF GOVERNMENT INCOMES POLICY DECREE

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 24 Feb 84 p 44

[Text] Decree-Law 15 February 1984, No 10

Urgent Measures Regarding [Inflation] Rates, Controlled Prices and Cost of Living Allowances

In view of articles 77 and 87 of the Constitution;

In view of the need and urgency to adopt immediate and temporary measures to contain inflation within average limits of the rate planned for 1984 in order to favor general economic recovery and to support the purchasing power of wages;

In view of the Council of Ministers' decision adopted in the 14 February 1984 meeting;

In reference to the prime minister's proposal made together with the ministers of labor, social security, industry, commerce and crafts, health, and treasury, in the public interest;

The president of the republic issues the following decree:

Article 1

For the year 1984, the duly considered annual average of the [inflation] rate and controlled price increases included in the ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute] index of consumer prices for the entire nation shall not generally exceed the maximum rate of inflation contained in the government's budget and planning report for the said year. To that end, within the limits of authority for coordination set forth in the legislative decree of 19 October 1944, No 347, issued by the Lieutenant General of the Realm, and of the directives issued by CIPE [Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning] as set forth in Article 2 of the decree issued by the president of the republic, dated 30 March 1968, No 626, the Interministerial Price Committee expresses a binding preliminary opinion on the proposals to increase rates and controlled prices which are to be deliberated by other offices of the central government administration, as well as those independently

administered, and issued directives in that regard to regional, provisional and city administrations and to provincial price committees concerning measures to be implemented within the geographical limits of their authority.

Article 2

1. Effective the first day of the month following the date of publication of the conversion of the present decree into law, the table attached to the Decree-Law of 29 January 1983, No 17, converted, with changes, into the Law of 25 March 1983, No 79, is replaced by that attached to the present decree.

2. Liquidation payments, however referred to, shall be excluded from family income as shown in the table referred to in the preceding paragraph 1.

Article 3

For 1984, the variation of the amount of cost of living allowances and similar allowances, for private workers, and of the special supplementary allowance referred to in Article 3 of the Decree-Law 29 January 1983, No 17, converted with changes into the Law of 25 March 1983, No 79, for public employees, shall not be set at more than two points beginning on 1 February, at more than two points from 1 May, at more than two points from 1 August and at more than three points from 1 November 1984.

Article 4

The time limit set forth in Article 32, Section 1, of the Law of 27 December 1983, No 730, regarding the general revision of the health services schedule of the National Health Service is extended to 15 April 1984.

Article 5

The present decree shall become effective on the day following the date of its publication in the GAZZETTA UFFICIALE of the Italian Republic and shall be presented to Parliament for conversion into law.

The present decree, bearing the government seal, shall be inserted into the official record of laws and decrees of the Italian Republic. All whose duty it is shall be required to obey it and to cause it to be obeyed.

Done at Rome, 15 February 1984.

[signed] Pertini, Craxi-De Michelis, Altissimo-Degan, Gorla-Gaspari.

Witnessed: Keeper of the Seal: Martinazzoli

Registered by the State Audit Court on 16 February 1984.

Government documents, Register No 49, Folio 10

Table for the determination of the supplementary allowances to be paid in addition to family allowances and to supplementary family payments for dependent children below 18 years of age.

Yearly family income
subject to IRPEF

Children

| | <u>1</u> <u>Amt/mo.</u> | <u>2</u> <u>Amt/mo.</u> | <u>3</u> <u>Amt/mo.</u> | <u>4 & up</u> <u>Amt/mo.</u> |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Up to 9,000,000 | 45,000 | 90,000 | 135,000 | 180,000 |
| From 9,000,001 to 10,000,000 | 39,000 | 82,000 | 127,000 | 171,000 |
| From 10,000,001 to 11,000,000 | 33,000 | 74,000 | 119,000 | 162,000 |
| From 11,000,001 to 12,000,000 | 27,000 | 66,000 | 111,000 | 153,000 |
| From 12,000,001 to 13,000,000 | 21,000 | 58,000 | 103,000 | 144,000 |
| From 13,000,001 to 14,000,000 | 15,000 | 50,000 | 95,000 | 135,000 |
| From 14,000,001 to 15,000,000 | | 42,000 | 87,000 | 126,000 |
| From 15,000,001 to 16,500,000 | | 34,000 | 79,000 | 117,000 |
| From 16,500,001 to 18,000,000 | | 26,000 | 69,000 | 108,000 |
| From 18,000,001 to 19,500,000 | | 20,000 | 55,000 | 99,000 |
| From 19,500,001 to 21,000,000 | | 15,000 | 39,000 | 90,000 |
| From 21,000,001 to 22,500,000 | | | 23,000 | 81,000 |
| From 22,500,001 to 24,000,000 | | | 15,000 | 72,000 |

The daily amount of family allowance increase is obtained by dividing the monthly amount by 26 and rounding out, if necessary, to the nearest 100 lire.

6034

CSO: 3528/64

REDUCTION IN FINANCING FOR PRIVATE SECTOR

Madrid ABC in Spanish 11 Mar 84 p 65

[Article by Amancio Fernandez]

[Text] Madrid--The new financing received by the private sector in 1983 fell by 25 percent in real terms below the 1982 level. The total amount of financing was 2.083 trillion pesetas, and the process was characterized by the gradual deterioration of public sector finances, the strengthening of the balance of payments and the toughening of monetary policy. This year a growth rate of about 8 percent is expected.

In absolute nominal values, financing of the private sector fell to the lowest level in 3 years. From 2.36 trillion pesetas in 1982, it dropped last year by 277 billion. In proportional terms, the decline amounted to 11.7 percent, when just a year before there had been an increase of about 12 percent. With corrections for inflation, the decline in real terms would be 25 percent, according to a study by the Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations (CEOE). This year an increase of about 8 percent is expected in private sector financing, a figure which is regarded as clearly insufficient for the normal functioning of private productive activity. The greatest shrinkage in 1983 took place in the credit system, with a fall of 341 billion pesetas. Financing from the bill market also dropped by 256 billion. There was an increase in the securities market (50 billion), and 47 billion more came from promissory notes by companies. In sum, internal sources of financing fell by 520 billion, while external financing rose by 233 billion, resulting in a deficit of 277 billion.

The causes for the decline in support from the credit system lie in the restrictive monetary measures introduced last April and intensified during the summer (a 1-point increase in the ratio of mandatory deposits, few resources available to credit institutions through regulated credit, greater absorption of resources by Certificates of Monetary Regulation, and a new 1-point increase in the cash reserve requirement in August).

The trend in new financing was influenced primarily by three factors: the progressive deterioration of public sector finances, the strengthening of the balance of payments, and the toughening of monetary policy. With respect to the first factor, the public sector needed more financing as a result of its worsening financial picture. This translated into an increase of 463 billion

pesetas, 53 percent more in new financing, compared to the 11.7 percent decline in financing to the private sector. Thus, its share in the total financing rose to 39 percent, from a figure of just 27 percent in 1982.

While the loss of foreign currency reserves during the first half of the year helped make up for the expansion of the public sector, during the second half, when the balance of payments recovered, in addition to increasing financing needs by the public sector, the external sector was expanding. The government's anti-inflation policy also had an impact, as it led to the contraction of liquid assets, which in turn took away financial resources.

New Financing of the Economy

| | 1982 | 1983 |
|----------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| | (trillions of pesetas) | |
| Public sector | .866 | 1.329 |
| Private sector | 2.360 | 2.083 |
| Total | 3.226 | 3.412 |
| GDP at market prices | 19.736 | 22.416 |
| | Percentage of GDP | |
| Public sector | 4.39 | 5.93 |
| Private sector | 11.96 | 9.29 |
| Total | 16.35 | 15.22 |
| | Percentage of Financing | |
| Public sector | 26.84 | 38.95 |
| Private sector | 73.16 | 61.05 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 |

8926

CS0: 3548/212

DEBTS, EXCESS LABOR IN SHIPYARDS SAP STATE FUNDS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 11 Mar 84 p 63

[Article by Vicente Clavero]

[Text] The shipbuilding sector cost the Spanish Government 44.981 billion pesetas in 1983. Of that amount, 21.386 billion went to pay for surplus personnel, and the remainder was used to cover the financial and operating deficits. The price of the ships delivered was under 100 billion pesetas.

The negotiations for the reconversion of the shipyards are about to enter a very important phase. The Ministry of Industry submitted to the unions the day before yesterday a document setting forth the groundwork for discussions. Within 10 days, specifically on 20 March, both parties will return to the bargaining table to determine whether an agreement is possible, and if so on what terms.

At the same time, the government has released a series of figures that illustrate the sector's situation; this information will undoubtedly serve as a frame of reference for the reconversion of the shipbuilding industry. One major aspect is the funds that were transferred from the state to this sector in 1983.

Official aid totaled 44.981 billion pesetas, of which 32.811 billion went to the large shipyards, 5.747 billion to small public-sector shipyards and 6.423 billion to small private shipyards. As for the nature of the funds, 2.287 billion corresponds to additional subsidies, 4.478 billion to financing, 12.582 billion to regulated jobs, and 27.999 billion to compensation for losses.

It is significant to note what the shipyards did with the money transferred from the state. No less than 21.386 billion pesetas was spent to underwrite surplus personnel (12.71 billion in the large firms and 8.676 billion in small and medium ones). To cover financial costs, 8.959 billion pesetas was earmarked, and 14.636 billion was used to underwrite operating deficits.

All these funds were not enough to prevent the shipyards from going into the red, however. The large yards lost 29.514 billion pesetas in 1983; the small

and medium public-sector firms lost 6.326 billion; and private firms lost 2.124 billion. AESA alone lost 24.122 billion pesetas; Astano 5.392 billion.

The primary cause of the shipyards' losses is the maintenance of productive capacity, despite the low utilization rate. The Spanish shipbuilding industry has a real capacity of 750,000 gross registered tons per year, and the average percentage of utilization was 55 percent in 1983.

The problem does not show signs of improving in 1984. At the beginning of the year the backlog of orders amounted to 115 ships, with a total of 569,266 compensated gross registered tons (TRBC). The construction of 17 of those ships has been halted, and 13 have already been built but not delivered, for a total of 191,837 TRBC.

This situation prompted the government to call for the reconversion of the sector, with the primary objective of providing the means to give the industry a competitive edge and bring its productive capacities into line with real demand. Aid to be received by the sector will be negotiated between the Ministry of Industry, the businesses and the labor unions; but production levels and surplus personnel will be determined on a company-by-company basis.

Public Funds Transferred to Shipyards
(billions of pesetas)

| Item | Large | Small and Medium | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|------------------|---------|
| | Shipyards Public | Public | Private |
| Additional Subsidies | 1.151 | .420 | .716 |
| Financing | -- | .819 | 1.294 |
| Regulated Jobs | 6.845 | 1.324 | 4.413 |
| Compensation for Losses | 24.815 | 3.184 | -- |
| Total | 32.811 | 5.747 | 6.423 |

8926

CSO: 3548/212

ULAGAY EXPRESSES SHARP DOUBTS ABOUT OZAL POLICY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 12 Mar 84 p 9

[Article by Osman Ulagay in The Column "Notes on The Economy": "Is The Alternative Ozal Admirers Valid?"]

[Text] The average annual growth rate of Turkey's national income (the GSMH) [GNP] was 6.6% during the First Plan period (1963 to 1967); 7.1% in Second Plan period (1968 to 1972); after materializing as 6.4% during the Third Plan period (1973 to 1977), it was 3% during the 1978 transitional year. That plan was mostly shelved and the growth rate of the 4th Plan, which was made subject to the 24 January agreement (1979 to 1983) remained 2.1% for that period. For the first time in 20 years, the growth rate of the national revenue was slower than the growth rate of the population during that period and the income per capita instead of increasing, decreased.

If we study the 1979 to 1983 period year by year, the GNP which was 0.4% in 1979, decreased by 1.1% in 1980 and showed a real increase of 4.1% in 1981, 4.6% in 1982 and 3.2% in 1983 (according to DIE [State Statistics Institute] projections). The regressions of 1979 and 1980 show that a saturation point, which bore the stamp of the 1963 to 1978 period of saving and growth, had been reached. The size of the growth rate for 1981 is, to a large extent, one result of the production discipline imposed by the special conditions 12 September brought about. As for 1982, it was saved by an unusual development in the agricultural sector and by the 62% leap in exports. When the agricultural sector stagnated in 1983, as the result of a loosening of restrictive policies, the growth rate fell again to 3%. That is, when the old model reached the saturation point, "the search for a new model" which was put on the agenda did not achieve a satisfactory growth rate.

I underline the "search for a new model" because, as I tried to point out in my article of last week also, it is hard to say that the "architect of the 24 January resolutions," Turgut Ozal, has found a model for saving and growth that can replace the old one, which reached the saturation point after 1977. One can only speak at best of a search for a model. And the noteworthy traits of this search are the following:

.The declaration that inflation is "monstrous" and a rejection of inflation and accrued capital.

.An emphasis on export oriented industrialization as an alternative to imports

and on foreign markets instead of domestic markets.

.A lessening in the industrial sector of protective measures and incentives such as cheap credit, cheap foreign currency and bans on imports, together with high real interest rates, realistic rates of exchange and partial import liberations being put on the agenda.

.A decrease in the public sector's influence on the economy.

. A belief in the regulating mechanisms of the marketplace rather than in planning.

. An increase of the impact of foreign capital on the economy.

As can be seen from the above mentioned indicative traits, they belong to some of the most successful models demonstrated by nations of Southeast Asia and in the last few years they have turned into the favorites of the IMF and the World Bank as a variety of the "export oriented industrialization model." At this point, it becomes necessary to discuss how suitable such a model is for Turkey and what kind of dangers it could create.

First, even countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, which adopted this model at the most favorable time of world conjunctures and skimmed the cream off the top, are looking today for alternatives to this model, being aware that in the world of today the limits of progress based on cheap labor and low value added branches of industry have been reached. While they are doing this, it is rather odd for Turkey, which has a domestic market of 50 million people, to adopt such a model.

Second, Western capital, which in the sixties and the seventies turned to Southeast Asia for cheap labor and a production which required a simple technology, now shows a tendency to go back home when it comes to intensive production which requires a high technology. This is when we should ask ourselves the question: "If we adopt this model will we attract foreign capital?"

Third, the unavoidable implications of this model which gives a priority to the foreign rather than the domestic market and which rejects inflation and accrued capital is the limitation of salaries. And this creates the question mark of how such a model, which will put on the agenda the integration of the trade union movement, can be reconciled with a pluralistic democracy?

Fourth, a concept which leaves the task of changing the structure of the economy to the forces of the marketplace plays a part in the destruction of the elements which cannot adapt themselves to the new structures, such as banks and firms. Blocking inflation, narrowing down the domestic market, making cheap credit and cheap foreign currency a thing of the past and lowering protective barriers brings some enterprises to the sinking point without managing to pave the way to the birth of new and sound enterprises which could increase production and employment.

Fifth, the nations that insist on exporting at all costs while lacking suitable conditions, sustained big losses in their trading capacity and became impoverished by the transfer of their resources abroad, as was also the case in Turkey

from 1980 to this day.

It is apparent that the model we are discussing is very questionable and risky from the standpoint of whether it is appropriate and up to date for Turkey. In such a case, to what extent is it right to insist on leaning in the direction of this model?

12175

1980 355-185

Isentropic TEMPERATURE in Turkish 11 Mar 81 p 3

Passage enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface:

(Text) [Abramyan, (TERCUMAN) - The Chairman of the Central Union of the Tradesmen's Security Cooperatives Union, Kevin Khadim, claimed that: "Price increases are beginning to eliminate the middle class," and he said: "tradesmen and artisans whose capital is melting away with every passing day cannot benefit the economy."

Onadiz participated in the meeting of the board of the Mahramanmamas Traders' Savings Cooperative and in the talk he gave he asked for "the removal without fail of the resolution with force of law which gave extensive powers to the People's Bank of Turkey." Onadiz claimed that the bank, taking advantage of the resolution, was trying to put the cooperatives out of circulation.

...and he is sure that they would give Premier Turgut Ozal a report on the subject of credit in treatment. emphasized that he believed the head of state would support Salim in that.

Chairman of the Central Union Board recalled that, due to the increasingly hard economic conditions in the market, follow-up claims had entered in the security organizations and he mentioned as follows:

"What are the following claims for cooperatives whose blocked capital has reached 100% or the stopping for an indefinite period of their investment allocations at the same time that new credits are cut off mean but: 'You no longer have the right to live.' The situation of the People's Bank which has resource problems is well known. The claim to it is to give support to tradesmen and artisans through the commercial banks included in the government program. Small business cannot be entrepreneurial or organized. This must be done with funds."

David Grubbs also said that the security cooperatives, which offer their services to "M.O.S." traitors and artisans, are wrong organizations and he added: "We are withdrawing now and when those who mislead citizens with false declarations will give the 175 billion Turkish liras they promised to distribute in 1978, we will be ready to accept for this."

TURKISH FOREIGN TRADE WITH WEST INTENSIFIES

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 6 Mar 84 pp 1,7

[Text] Turkey's trade oriented to Islamic countries which has been increasing since 1980 started declining after 1982, whereas trade with Western countries and primarily with the European Economic Community has entered a period of expansion once again. While the share of external trade with Islamic countries (which had the highest share in 1982 with 44.9 percent) declined to 42.2 percent, the share of the EEC countries (which had the lowest share in 1982 with 29.1 percent) reached a volume of 30.7 percent of the overall external trade.

The January 24 resolutions were put into effect in 1980 to create the primary foundation of a free market economy, aiming at a structural re-orientation of Turkish exports and a diversification of the export base with regard to markets and goods. This policy which has received political support has borne positive results in 1981 and 1982 with Turkey managing to free itself, relatively speaking, from the grip of its traditional export markets in the West and entering the Middle Eastern and North African markets. The growth in exports to Islamic countries led to a corresponding increase in the share of imports from these countries. Thus, the weight of the Middle Eastern and North African countries in the overall volume of external trade has become quite noticeable.

Competition with the West in the Islamic Market

However, the conjunctural developments that densely affect the region are preventing the commercial relationship between Turkey and the Islamic countries from settling into a process of permanent growth. The economics of the western countries, on the other hand, are structured in such a way that they are in a position to obtain a major share out of Turkey's foreign trade.

Turkey which already faces problems in production, organisation, price and financing in trying to develop its exports, has also to contend with western competition in the markets of Islamic countries. While these obstacles had been overcome to a certain extent in 1981 and 1982 through a determined policy of incentives, it is apparent that Turkey's economic structure which is vul-

nerable to international and regional conjunctures has not yet acquired the capability to maintain its hold over existing markets.

The Share of Countries

According to the calculations of the State Institute of Statistics based on economic indicators, within the total volume of Turkish foreign trade in 1980 the OECD countries had a 47.8 percent share, EEC countries had 31.8 percent and the Islamic countries 34 percent. In 1981 when the initial effects of the 14 January Economic Stabilisation Program were felt, the volume of foreign trade climbed up to \$13.6 billion and the share of the OECD countries slightly increased to 47.3 percent and the share of the EEC countries dropped noticeably to 29.6 percent. The share of the Islamic countries, on the other hand, increased by 5 percentage points reaching 38.7 percent.

1982 was the 'boom' year as far as the Islamic countries' share of Turkish foreign trade is concerned. They increased their share to 44.9 percent within a total trade volume of \$14.6 billion, whereas it was observed that EEC remained static at 29 percent and the OECD countries likewise maintained their share from the previous year. In 1983, however, while the OECD countries increased their share of Turkish trade to 48.3 percent and the EEC countries to 30.7 percent, the share of the Islamic countries dropped to 42.2 percent.

12466

100: 0554/174

The development of foreign trade according to country groups (1980-1983 billion dollars)

| Countries | 1980 | Percent | 1981 | Percent | 1982 | Percent | 1983 | Percent |
|----------------------|------|---------|------|---------|------|---------|------|---------|
| OECD | 51 | 47.8 | 6.6 | 47.9 | 6.9 | 47.9 | 7.2 | 48.3 |
| EEC | 3.4 | 31.8 | 4.0 | 29.6 | 4.2 | 29.1 | 4.6 | 30.7 |
| Islamic Countries | 3.6 | 34.0 | 5.2 | 38.7 | 6.6 | 44.9 | 6.3 | 42.2 |

OVERVIEW OF TURKEY'S 1983 TRADE PERFORMANCE

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 6 Mar 84 p 1

[Text] According to the official announcement by the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) our exports indicated a decreasing trend last year for the first time since 1977. According to the SIS announcement made last weekend the decrease in our 1983 exports vis-à-vis the 1982 figures is 3 per thousand. The official figures announced by the SIS are not exhausted by these naturally. The share of exports to the EEC countries which has been continually falling since 1980 has again indicated a rising trend in 1983, recording 30.7 percent which gives it second place after the Islamic countries.

Another significant conclusion to be drawn from the SIS figures is the decline in exports to the Islamic countries to which we had turned as an alternative. Our exports to this country group has dropped compared to last year with its share of 42.2 percent.

As it has been repeated over and again in this column, stable markets and stable commodity groups play an important role in the 'balancing' of Turkey's balance of payments. As things are, we should not be too surprised to see that the conjunctural conditions affecting the Middle East have made a rather adverse impact on Turkey's external trade during the previous year. It can no longer be ignored that the Iran-Iraq war (which has acquired a gangrenous character) has had a negative impact on the purchasing power of these two countries which can now be considered as our trading partners.

It was hardly to be expected that there would be a demand for all kinds of Turkish goods considering Iraq's curtailed volume of trade because of the war, despite the rise in the Iranian demand. At the same time, it can be expected that the deep financial crisis experienced by the Islamic countries, most of which are OPEC members, may continue to have adverse effects on Turkish foreign trade as the case of Libya indicates.

However, perhaps the real significance of the figures lie in relation to the EEC countries. At a time when we have serious political difficulties, our commercial relations leave much to be desired and restrictions proliferate, trade with the EEC countries has retained its self-contained stability. Ex-

ports to the EEC countries increased from \$4.2 billion to \$4.6 billion, and the increase has been reflected in the share within the overall volume of exports.

It was known that the trade with the Socialist bloc would decline once the new foreign exchange regime was adopted. On top of this, Turkey has whittled away the whole of 1983 with false hopes pinned on the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. The results do not require us to be wholly pessimistic as yet. It is natural that growth cannot last forever and it will have to come to a grind sooner or later. And the inevitable pause in the growth of exports to the Islamic countries has come in 1983. Temporary pauses are not that important in a mobilization effort. Bottlenecks could be overcome in a short period of time. The important thing, however, is that the causes underlying these bottlenecks should not be of a structural nature, and that Turkey maintains its exports drive through the creation of stable markets.

12466

CSO: 3554/174

PROGRESS REPORT ON OZAL ECONOMIC POLICY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 Mar 84 pp 1,11

[Text] As the Ozal government is completing its third month in office, it is observed that black clouds over the economy have not dispersed and that there are increasing worries over certain areas.

Most of the government's measures to re-orientate the economy have not yet borne results. While it is noted that exports, which had lost pace in 1983, could not regain momentum as of the first month of 1984, there is no sign that the inflation is slowing down in the first two months of the year.

Furthermore, with the tightening of money supply 'payment problems' in the industrial and commercial sectors have become prevalent again and the banking system has also been adversely affected. The value of the Turkish lira (which had seemingly stabilized vis-à-vis the dollar since mid-January due to the dollar's loss of value in world markets) is now rapidly sliding down vis-à-vis the D-mark.

The Ozal government intends to create new resources by encouraging savings through measures such as those concerning interest (on 19 December 1983), the 'sales bill' which had a noisy passing through the assembly last week, and the reorganisation of the capital market which is expected to come under discussion this week. There is an ongoing debate on whether the measures concerning interest (which received reinforcement through the introduction of 'monthly interest' in early March) have been able to attract 'fresh money' to the banks in expected quantities. Many bankers share the view that the 'deposit explosion' expected after the 19 December decisions (which raised rates on deposits significantly) has not materialized. It is argued that in an economy where there has not been significant increases in revenue during recent years, the volume of savings cannot be increased by merely raising interest rates or creating new investment vehicles like 'certificates of shared revenue'. Those holding such views do not regard ventures like the franchise of bridge and dam revenues or the sale of the SEE (state economic enterprises) shares as producing major results in the short-term. They maintain that the government will encounter serious difficulties in closing this year's deficit.

While the economy continues to have trouble creating new resources, the appearance of 'tight money' policy, designed to prevent inflation, is putting more pressure on firms which have already been experiencing payment difficulties. It is expected that this pressure will further increase during March, which is the tax month, with the consequent proliferation of protests of exchange and bounced cheques. The payment difficulties of firms are inevitably passed on to the banks. The condition of firms which cannot repay their loans, or even the interest on their loans has become the primary problem for the banks today. The banks' clients, on the other hand, complain that the banks, which have lately been the recipients of favorable publicity, have not been lowering interest rates in a noticeable way, and that it is not possible to do business and repay previous loans on such interest rates.

At the Inflation Front

The condition of firms which have been disillusioned with the domestic markets and those which could not lower their costs (primarily through foreign financing) is creating a problem of inflation control as well. The rapid increases in wholesale prices lend weight to the belief that it is supply factors are responsible for inflation rather than the pressure of demand.

The indicators of the wholesale price index signal a 55-60 percent increase during the last three months (November, December, January). The February figures of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce wage-earners cost of living index indicate that retail prices are increasing at an annual rate of about 100 percent. According to the ICC index prices have increased 10 percent during the previous three months and 32 percent during the previous year.

While some experts are maintaining that the increased unit costs (due to the low utilization of capacity by firms which cannot find markets at home or abroad) is the prime cause behind inflation, it is apparent that the government has placed its hopes on liquidation of inventories when tight monetary policies take effect and also the revitalization of exports.

Difficult Passage in Exports

However, the prospects at the exports front do not presently paint a bright picture at all. Exports in 1983 totalled \$5.7 billion (falling short of the 1982 figure). Thus, it would be extremely difficult to realize the 1984 target set for this year which would mean a 40 percent increase from 1983. The statement by Ekrem Pakdemirli, the undersecretary of the treasury and foreign trade, that January 1984 exports might fall short of January 1983 exports, does not give reason to be optimistic about the realization of the 1984 exports target.

Meanwhile, it is maintained that measures designed to force the exporters out (measures like this year's rise in interest on export credits, freezing of export credit discounts and the lowering of tax related to exports) might have adverse effects on 1984 exports. It is supposed that the expected growth of world trade this year would create a more suitable environment for the increase of Turkey's exports. As to the imports front, no action

there is plenty of discussion, people are wondering how things will turn out.

Stagnation in Agriculture

In 1983, there has been a drop, for the first time in years, in our traditional exports, the agricultural products. Agricultural production, which did not increase due to insufficient rain last year, is not expected to record a major boom this year. While the stagnation in agriculture is stimulating the price rises in agricultural products and foodstuffs, it is also limiting the export potential. If agricultural subsidies prove to be insufficient as is the case in the tobacco prime rate, then the present trend will be more distinctive and Turkey, which had to import barley and wheat this year, would be in a position of spending foreign exchange for agricultural products.

All these indicators show that the clouds over the economy have not dispersed and that worries have increased in various sectors. Meanwhile, it is said that the overseas contractors, who have been promoted as the 'flashy sector' of the last few years, are facing serious problems, particularly in Libya, and that this might have adverse repercussions for the Turkish banks.

12466

CSO: 3554/174

RESEARCH CENTERS FOCUS ON OCEAN FLOOR NODULES

Paris LES ECHOS in French 2 Feb 84 p 6

[Article by Olivier Fleurot: "Some Still Very Mysterious Little Balls"]

[Text] It is now some years since Europeans panicked on seeing the Americans increase the pace in the nodule field. But they were consoled by discovering a little later that this intense effort (spearheaded by the Hughes Co) was enjoying financial support...from the CIA and aimed at...picking up Russian submarines.

Today, however, some experts think that the USA will exploit the nodules before the year 2000 for reasons of safety of supply and despite the excess cost. So, what must be done on our side?

A report by the Academy of Sciences considers that only an extended "cartelization" of one or two markets (cobalt, manganese) would make it possible for nodules to compete with land ores on the economic level before the year 2000.

This project would be profitable, according to criteria for public or slightly subsidized industry, if a single cartel existed for ferromanganese. With two cartels (ferromanganese and cobalt), private industry criteria would be valid.

In spite of this far-off exploitation, the reporter considers that a nodule program is justified by its contribution to the safety of supplies.

Thus, by proving that they are capable of processing nodules, the French can contribute to dissuading land ore producers from raising their prices. But this is not the only weapon: thus the report suggests examining the alternatives (exploitation of lower-grade land ores located in safe areas, stockpiling) and comparing the costs.

It is also a question of clarifying at what level (national, European, Western world) we wish to establish the answers to possible crises.

What do we actually know about polymetallic nodules? After collecting them at depths of 4,000 and 5,000 meters in various oceans, we are sure that these are balls 3 to 10 centimeters in diameter composed of manganese and iron, nickel, cobalt, copper and molybdenum oxides.

But on the other hand, we do not know how they are formed (one hypothesis would attribute an average speed of formation of a few millimeters per million years) and how they are distributed on the vast bottoms.

Even worse, the detailed topography of the potential deposits for exploitation would need broader research and above all new techniques, such as a multibeam bathymetric sounder, tractor-drawn devices close to the bottom or autonomous manned submarines, such as CNEXO's National Center for Ocean Exploration future SM-97, capable of descending to 6,000 meters.

A big blur on the whole, whereas the French consortium AFERNOD French Association for Study and Research on Nodules, in charge of the file, already spent 385 million 1982 francs between 1970 and 1981.

Above all, we are very far away (under the seas) from knowing how to glean these little balls. As the specialists judiciously say, it involves going through a 5,000-meter vertical slice of water.

Several means are envisaged: a cable very simply pulling buckets on the bottom, a hydraulic system bringing up the nodules in a rigid pipe by submerged pumps and an air lift, or straight out autonomous shuttles that collect the nodules on the bottom and bring them back to a factory ship on the surface (a prototype is being perfected by the AEC and the France-Dunkirk Shipyards).

Some 130 million francs have already been spent on the study of collection procedures alone and CNEXO experts envisage the development of one of the three procedures over periods going from 7 (mechanical system) to 11 (hydraulic system) or 13 years (shuttles), at costs varying respectively from 400 to 1,000 million francs.

Not for Another 10 or 15 Years

First of all, CNEXO suggests setting up a single team to make the final choice of collection procedure, a study that would be spread out over 2 years and would cost 155 million francs.

In brief, without even speaking of the problems of processing ores, where the French seem to be well placed, or the impact of nodule collection on the environment or the legal difficulties linked to the law of the sea, there are still numerous unknowns.

The exploitation of ore from the vast bottoms is not foreseeable for another 10 or 15 years. That is indeed the only certainty that comes out of the Academy of Science report. This will have had the merit of putting everything on the table and opening the dialog.

An apparently difficult dialog, even among the various bodies that are studying the nodules.

SOVIET BLACK SEA ECONOMIC ZONE DISTURBS ANKARA

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 6 Mar 84 pp 11,12

[Text] The Soviet declaration of a 200-mile 'economic zone' in its coastal waters, based upon the new Law of the Sea Convention, is not expected to raise a problem between Turkey and the Soviet Union over its implications with regard to the Black Sea. However, the implementation of the Soviet decision makes it necessary for the two countries to get together and reach a settlement.

Before we examine the situation with regard to the Black Sea created by the unilateral Soviet decision we should briefly explain what the concept 'economic zone' entails. The 'economic zone' is a new concept introduced by the Law of the Sea Convention which was signed at the end of the Third Law of the Sea Conference in 1982.

The convention defines 'economic zone' as the water column, seabed and subsoil in an area covering 200 miles from the coastline. Without the limits of the economic zone, states are accorded sovereign rights to engage in all manner of research and operational activity concerning living and inanimate resources contained in the water column and the continental shelf.

Thus the economic zone encompasses the continental shelf. Since the 'economic zone' brings along the right to exploit the water column as well as the continental shelf, it carries primary significance with regard to fishing rights.

This brief overview might lead one to suspect that the Soviet decision to declare a 200-mile zone would create a situation adversely affecting Turkey. When one recalls that the distance between the coastlines of Turkey and the Soviet Union does not even reach 400 miles one may get the impression that it is indeed the case.

However, according to the experts in international law who we consulted, we should not be interpreting the Soviet decision in this way. The reason for this is as follows:

In an agreement signed in 1976, Turkey and the Soviet Union had delineated the Black Sea continental shelf between themselves in accordance with the principle of 'rightfulness'. As such, the Black Sea continental shelf had been divided into two by a median line equidistant from the coastlines of the two countries. And the seabed to the north of this line was deemed under Soviet jurisdiction, while the seabed to the south of this line was deemed under Turkish jurisdiction.

To put the matter in another way, Turkey and the Soviet Union have already delineated the continental shelf which the 'economic zone' encompasses in accordance with the principle of 'rightfulness' in any case.

The Principle of Rightfulness in the Economic Zone

Whereas the Law of the Sea Convention stipulates that the breadth of the 'economic zone' shall be 200 miles, in the case of countries with coastlines facing one another it is envisioned that the economic zone would be determined through a settlement based upon the principle of rightfulness just as it has been done in cases involving the continental shelf. Thus, the principle of rightfulness which is envisioned for the delimitation of the continental shelf becomes operative in the delimitation of the economic zone as well.

According to international law experts, "things being as they are", we can expect to see Turkey and the Soviet Union resort to the same methods - as a matter of recognized custom - in the delineation of economic zones. (Methods used in the 1976 continental shelf settlement, that is).

At this point, it may be thought that certain legal complications might arise for Turkey in declaring an economic zone since Turkey is not a party to the new Law of the Sea Convention signed by the Soviet Union. However, not being a party to an agreement does not mean that Turkey cannot enjoy a right which has attained the status of internationally recognized custom.

Yet it is apparent that the Soviet declaration of economic zone in the Black Sea will necessitate a new settlement between Turkey and its northern neighbor.

After the announcement of the said decision, Turkey has already requested information through diplomatic channels about the implementation in the Black Sea. Ankara will examine the issue in light of the information received from the Soviets. At this stage we will have to wait for information relayed from Moscow to Ankara if we are to know how the Black Sea economic zones will be determined and what kind of diplomatic course will be charted in the process.

12466

OSD: 3554/176

'ACID RAIN' FIGHT PLANNED BY EC PARLIAMENT

Bonn EUROPÄISCHE ZEITUNG in German Feb 84 p 3

[Article: "Fight 'Acid Rain.' Danger to All--Put an End to Air Pollution"]

[Text] Sulfur and nitrogen oxides, ammonia, heavy metals, carbon monoxide and other substances produced primarily by combustion processes are pollutants which are returned to the earth with the rain. They are the cause of damage to millions of hectares of forested land within the EC, in northern and eastern Europe, as well as in the U.S. and Canada.

The EC Parliament has long been aware that air pollution has become one of the greatest environmental problems of our time. On January 20 the Parliament requested that the EC Commission develop a short-term basic program for fighting air pollution. In the long term, technologies leading to reorganization of the energy sector should be kept in mind, damaging emissions should be kept to a minimum (as near to "zero emissions" as technically feasible) and energy-saving methods should be promoted in order to keep energy consumption as low as possible. In order to reach these goals and put a stop to such acute damage, guidelines should be set as soon as possible establishing air quality and emission standards for the most critical air pollutants known today. As of January 1, 1986, the amount of pollutants in automobile exhaust is to be radically reduced. According to the EC Parliament, emissions containing the most critical substances causing air pollution within the EC should be cut in half during the first five years, then--as quickly as possible--reduced by a total of 75 percent of current emissions. In this connection, the Parliament applauded the measures taken by the commission against air pollution due to exhaust gas from spark-ignition vehicle engines, but at the same time underscored the importance of promoting public transportation over private vehicles, the use of liquefied petroleum gas and the introduction of lead-free gasoline as soon as possible. The causer liability clause, an aid program at the EC level to support small and medium-sized plants and less-developed regions, as well as an examination of the financial agencies of the EC and their ability to stimulate such activity will be considered in the financing of this program. The EC Parliament placed particular emphasis on a large-scale battle against air pollution without regard for political boundaries. It also emphasized coordination of research on air pollution

in order to prevent duplication of effort and to ensure that the results would be available as soon as possible.

Hemmo Muntingh (SOZ/NL) pointed out the extent to which the forests were already dying. One third of the forests in the FRG are already affected, while in the Netherlands 95 percent of all coniferous trees have already been destroyed. Much has already been lost and only quick, forceful action can save what is left.

"Acid rain" is not a disease that can be cured by a few injections, warned Beate Weber (SOZ/D). A continuous process is involved which affects not just the forests. Investigations have shown its damaging effects on human health, as well as on numerous materials. Everyone is passing the buck and no one is doing anything about it, she charged. "Why has the Council done nothing to implement the guidelines regarding air pollution and control of large-scale furnaces? Where is the lead-free gasoline? Why has the commission not undertaken steps to introduce comprehensive speed limits which could lead to a significant reduction in emissions of nitrogen oxides. Why don't the German Laender do something to better equip the air quality supervisory agencies?" Weber warned against believing that a solution to the problem could be found in nuclear power plants. The construction of new nuclear power plants would require ten years, and during this time insurmountable damage could occur. Moreover, desulfurization in all the coal-fired power plants of the FRG would cost no more than one new nuclear power plant.

The health of the population is the first priority, then comes the undoubtedly frightening question of the dying forests, was the opinion of Meinolf Mertens (EVP-CD/D). Up to now the forests have acted as a filter limiting air pollution.

Heinrich Juergens (LIB/D) agreed that the battle against air pollution must know no political borders. It would be wrong, however, he said, to see acid rain as the sole cause of the dying forests; on the contrary, numerous other causes must not be ignored.

12552

CSO: 3620/201

BRIEFS

COMMISSION ADDRESSES AIR POLLUTION--The European environmental ministers decided Thursday in Brussels to tackle the problems involved in placing a limit on emissions coming from industrial installations and leading to the risk of air pollution. This decision on principle will enable the European Commission as a next step to submit to the ministers a proposal to establish community standards limiting these emissions, standards which will be due to go into effect in the EEC within a period of three years after their adoption by the Council. Huguette Bouchardeau, the French secretary of state, who chairs the meeting, explained: "Today we have made the first great policy decision. It is an important step." Until now, there were significant differences of opinion between Great Britain and its partners on this same principle and the implementation of these controls, London expressing the desire that the Community do no more than establish "quality objectives" with respect to the areas threatened by air pollution. In coming around Thursday to the decision to support the principle of emission standards, the UK finally accepted the idea that the 10 should attack not the consequences, but rather the origin of these pollutions. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 2 Mar 84 p 5] 8089

DISAGREEMENT ON TOXIN DISPOSAL--The environmental ministers of the 10 were unable to reach an agreement in Brussels on regulating the transport of about 30 tons of toxic waste which circulate from one Common Market country to the other every year, according to what was learned at the close of the Council meeting. Almost a year after the affair involving the barrels of dioxine at Seveso, the FRG has blocked the adoption by the 10 of a regulation on the transport of toxic waste within the EEC. The environmental ministers, who for several months have been doing their utmost to impose a strict control on the conveying of dangerous waste, clashed with the FRG, which is eager to retain its own control apparatus. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 8 Mar 84 p 5] 8089

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

13 APRIL 1984